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A.   BACKGROUND 
Senator Sam Nunn, D-GA., Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
said in a hearing, of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), on 5 February 1992, "It 
seems that these countries have decided they would rather look to the United 
l 
States than strengthen their forces." 
In response to the Senator's statement, two simple questions must be 
addressed. How could these countries strengthen their forces while the 
Congress, in most cases, is denying important arms sales to those countries? 
How could these countries improve their capabilities when the arms control 
advocates are condemning the United States' role as the leading provider of arms 
to the region and calling for policy changes that would greatly restrict arms 
sales? 
Along with the hurdles set by the Congress and the calls for arms 
restrictions, the main method of providing security assistance, Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS), contains policies that impact negatively on its customers. These 
impacts are evident in the FMS case implementation, the delivery of the defense 
articles, the pricing of case, and logistical support. 
When the customer signs and pays an initial deposit for an FMS case, he 
will have to wait for that case to be implemented. The implementation date, the 
basis for the delivery date, can be lengthy and in some cases may extend to over 
a year. 
Once the FMS case is implemented and the delivery date is set, the 
customer cannot expect the delivery on that date, simply because everything is 
estimated. The customer can still expect delays in the delivery of the items that 
can extend to years. It is obvious that the case closure will be affected. In some 
cases an item will never be delivered, and the customer must accept closing the 
case without receiving that item. 
l 
Philip Finnegan, "Fractured Cooperation May Dash Gulf Security; Iranian Rearmament Poses 






FMS customers have enjoyed the use of Special Defense Acquisition Funds 
(SDAF), which were initiated by the Reagan administration. The SDAF enables 
the Department of Defense (DoD) to reduce customer waiting time for selected 
items and improve the department's response to emergency foreign 
requirements. It is unfortunate that under the Clinton administration the SDAF 
was reduced in a defense cut. It has not been recapitalized for FY 1994 with the 
anticipation that it could totally defunct by FY 1998. 
The prices in an FMS case are estimates. The difference between the 
estimate and the actual price can vary by more than 10 percent of the initial price. 
The increase in prices, in most cases, affect the customer's budgeting, and 
ultimately the execution of other projects. 
The logistic support for the weapon system, once delivered, may be done 
via a special program called Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement 
(CLSSA). This program, which is designed to provide responsive follow-on 
supply support to the purchaser on an equal basis with the United States units, 
has been highly criticized for its poor performance. Major weapon systems 
readiness, a major factor required to win an evenly matched war or to sustain a 
defense for a period of time until support is received, is also disrupted due to the 
policies of the CLSSA program. The U.S. DoD had taken into account readiness, 
and for that reason the CLSSA is established, but it seems that consideration up 
until now was only given to repairable parts with no attention being given to 
ammunition and ammunition components. 
Collectively, those policies are affecting the planning and readiness of the 
recipient forces. For a small country like Bahrain, that is heavily dependent on 
the FMS in building its moderate size defense forces, good planning and timely 
weapon system delivery and readiness are important factors affecting Bahrain's 
ability to absorb the initial attack and sustain a defense until support is received 
from outside. 
It is clear that the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is becoming more capable, 
but so are the threats. As indicated by General Joseph Hoar, Commander in 
Chief of the U.S. Central Command in 1992, in a congressional hearing on 5 
March 1992: 
i i
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Iran has been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in an 
effort to re-establish itself as a prominent regional power. Iraq too 
presents dangers for gulf nations. If the sanctions are not 
maintained, it is possible for Iraq's military to return to pre-August 
1990 levels within eight to nine years. 
Bahrain has demonstrated over time its support for U.S. policy in the 
region. In his book, It Doesn't Take A Hero, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 
Commander of the Allied Forces in the Gulf War, said: 
The tiny island emirate of Bahrain had favored a U.S. presence in 
the gulf. It had hosted the headquarters of the Navy's Middle East 
Force since the Truman era. Despite criticism from other gulf 
nations, the emir of Bahrain had remained steadfast in his 
commitment, and his kingdom was without doubt America's best 
friend in the Middle East. Some of its neighbors now realize that, 
had Bahrain barred the U.S. Navy from its port, the outcome of the 
tanker war would have been quite different. 
The Arabian Gulf region, in all likelihood, will remain a crucial American 
interest through the next several decades. The world depends on the petroleum 
reserves of the Gulf region to fuel its economic engine. In his recent book, former 
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, described the free flow of 
oil from the Gulf as crucial to the U.S. as blood pumping through an artery.4 
The U.S. offers security assistance to strengthen the national security of 
friendly nations, and to support existing or prospective democratic institutions 
and market economics. As the U.S. seeks to shape the emerging post-cold war 
international environment, security assistance provides a vital element of 
continuity and contributes to secure, stable relationships. The threats to U.S. 
interests, which recent experience shows will continue to arise, and the instability 
which invariably accompanies changing times, require policies that support 
independent political development, promote stability, and encourage rational 
economic development and reform. 
3     Ibld- 
H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 322-3. 
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With the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
comes the desire to attain peace dividends in the form of a reduced defense 
budget and the rapid downsizing of the U.S. military structure. Nevertheless, 
programs which protected and advanced U.S. interest during the cold war 
clearly now require reconsideration and reform to meet the challenges of the new 
environment. 
These challenges make it difficult for the U.S. to defend the free world's 
interest, to assure reasonable access to raw materials that are becoming ever 
more scarce, and to assure freedom of access to the sea lines, without which 
international trade could not readily be conducted or seaborne support for the 
U.S. forces or its allies provided in time of war. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 ultimately demonstrated 
the value of past security assistance programs during the conduct of the war and 
the responsiveness of the security assistance community during the war. 
However, it also shows how costly a war can be. Besides its direct cost of about 
$61.1 billion, the Gulf war still has its effect on the people, environment, 
agriculture, economy, and water resources. 
The United States must in today's world improve its security assistance 
programs' policies to better support its friends so that the chance of U.S. forces 
being deployed in a crisis are reduced, to insure regional stability, to allow 
friends to participate in regional or collective defense arrangements, and to 
protect its competitive position in markets. 
Such improvements shall reduce the problems that involve the timing of 
the mechanism of military response and will enable the U.S. and its allies to 
respond more quickly to aggression. It will also avail tactical advantages, 
providing coalition forces direct defense to defeat aggression, rather than 
depending on the more expensive counterattack to regain lost territory. 
This thesis will focus on the following issues that affect the planning and 
readiness in BDF: 
• Implementation and Delivery Process. 





•   Cooperative   Logistics   Supply   Support   Arrangement       (CLSSA) 
program. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Focusing on Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the primary objective of this 
thesis is to answer: What is the impact of U.S. arms transfers policies on recipient 
force planning and readiness? The focus will be on the Bahrain Defense Force 
(BDF). 
The FMS is governed and directed by the policies of the U.S. security 
assistance which are viewed differently by each administration. This thesis shall 
first address the U.S. security assistance and the policies of U.S. arms transfer 
starting with the Reagan's administration, where it was regarded as a "vital and 
constructive instrument" of the American foreign policy, until the Clinton 
administration where a new direction is considered as set forth by Secretary 
Christopher "with the new centrality of economic policy in our foreign policy." 
Next FMS processes, as set forth in the DoD publications, will be explored 
with an emphasis on the issues causing the effects outlined earlier. Then direct 
commercial sales, an alternative to the FMS, will be described. Additionally, the 
way that BDF is employing the FMS shall also be explored. Finally, even though 
the FMS is criticized by its customers, they still prefer it over direct commercial 
sales. What are their reasons? 
Finally, this thesis will illustrate the problems that are caused by the DoD 
policies, and the findings will be summarized. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II, U.S. Security Assistance, describes the U.S. security assistance 
as follows: (1) its background (2) the evolution of its policies, (3) description of its 
programs, (4) the elements of the U.S. policy in the Arabian Gulf, (5) the position 
of the U.S. in the arms market, and (6) chapter summary. 
Chapter III focuses on the Foreign Military Sales Description. This chapter 
is organized as follows: (1) background, (2) FMS process from the forward 
5 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management,  The Management of Security 
6   Assistance, 14th Edition (Dayton: Wright-Patterson AFB., 1994), 25. 
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planning phase to the case closure phase, (3) description of the initial and follow- 
on supports to the customers, (4) the FMS financial aspects, (5) description of the 
direct commercial sales, and (6) chapter summary. 
Chapter IV, addresses the Bahrain Defense Force and its dealings with the 
FMS. This chapter is organized as follows: (1) background of the State of Bahrain, 
the evolution of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), BDF and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, BDF and the United States, and application of FMS for the BDF, (2) 
BDF's in-house mechanism, used to deal with the FMS, (3) the advantages of 
both the FMS and the DCS, from the BDF perspective, and (4) chapter summary. 
Chapter V considers the impact of U.S. FMS policies on BDF. This chapter, 
after the introduction addresses: (1) impact on BDF's procurement planning, (2) 
impact on BDF's supply support and weapon system readiness, and (3) chapter 
summary. 
Chapter VI, addresses: (1) the summary of the thesis and (2) the 
recommendations. 
6 
II. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
Security assistance has been part of international relations as long as man 
has been preparing for and engaging in war. Whenever it is assumed to be in the 
best interests of one, nation to give or sell arms or other military support to 
another, arms transfers of some type have taken place. The supply and demand 
for arms has been, and remains, a natural consequence of the desire for achieving 
national goals while at the same time maintaining national security. 
In the postwar world, arms transfers have been used primarily by the 
industrialized states in the Northern Hemisphere to promote a wide range of 
political and military objectives. For the United States and the Soviet Union, 
which together until recently dominated the arms transfer market, arms transfers 
have played a prominent role in their geostrategic competition. Primarily, arms 
transfers were used to promote five broad categories of objectives: 
• To support recipient regime stability. 
• To ensure forward basing opportunities. 
• To increase influence in areas of strategic competition. 
• To affect regional balances of power. 
• To attempt to influence the orientation of recipient regimes on a host of 
regional and global issues. 
A host of secondary objectives may also be identified. For example, for the U.S. 
Government, arms transfers were frequently used to promote internal security 
and self-sufficiency in defense for recipient regimes, as well as to augment the 
commonality of defense capabilities and joint defense arrangements for an array 
of client states. This occurred as successive administrations attempted to 
maintain the international status quo through the implementation of a 







multilateral structure of alliances with anticommunist regimes on the periphery 
of the Soviet Union or in areas of potential Soviet penetration. The capability to 
ensure forward basing for military forces, including base rights, overflight 
privileges, the emplacement of intelligence-gathering facilities, and the 
prepositioning of war material, became an important element of these competing 
Soviet and U.S. strategic orientations. Arms transfers were used to secure access, 
leverage, and influence in key recipient regimes, to influence their orientations 
on a plethora of international and regional issues of importance to the supplier's 
conception of its security interests, to promote access to strategic resources, and 
to influence regional balances of power in political and overtly military ways. 
The recipients of these arms for the most part had their own agendas, 
which did not necessarily correlate to the global communist-anticommunist 
struggle but rather related in direct ways to their own, more traditional, and 
often more immediate conceptions of security. Regardless of the purpose, the 
nations of the world have demonstrated an almost insatiable appetite for the 
acquisition of modern armaments. The incidence of interstate and intrastate 
violence is grim testament not only to the level of insecurity in the international 
system but also to the condition that prudence in preparing for war is almost 
universally viewed as the sine qua non of promoting national security. As a 
consequence, nations throughout the world seek modern arms. The resultant 
international traffic in arms for the most part reflects the disparities in 
technological development and industrial capability that exist between suppliers 
and recipients. 
Before the mechanism of the U.S. arms trade is explained in Chapter III, 
the policies of the U.S. security assistance that govern and direct that mechanism 
shall be explored in this chapter. 
The organization of this chapter shall start with a background of U.S. 
security assistance, where its history and definition will be explored. Second, the 
evolution of U.S. arms trade policies from Reagan to Clinton will be addressed. 
Third, the seven elements of the security assistance will be explained. Fourth, 
David J.  Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, Marketing Security Assistance  (Lexington: 












focusing on the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. policy will be addressed. Finally, the U.S. 
position in world arms sales will be examined. 
B.       BACKGROUND 
1.        History 
After the Second World War, the term used for   transfers was changed 
from "aid" to "trade," arms have become more sophisticated, the focus of the 
arms trade has shifted to Third World countries, and more countries have been 
10 
able to procure advanced and sophisticated arms.   The Truman Doctrine of 1947 
marked the beginning of the American policy of "long-term, patient but firm and 
vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies." Truman found himself 
beset by serious problems when the war ended in 1945. In Europe the Soviet 
Union, a former U.S. ally, had become hostile to U.S. interest. Additionally, the 
Soviet Union heightened international anxiety when it seized control of several 
small Eastern European countries and threatened the independence of Turkey 
and Greece. Soviet-supported communist guerrilla action in Greece, and Soviet 
diplomatic pressure in Turkey, were causes for great concern to President 
Truman. He believed the unrest in Greece and the overt Soviet political action in 
Turkey were blatant attempts to establish a strong communist presence in the 
region. Truman also felt that the spread of Soviet hegemony was inimical to the 
national interest of America, especially in the non-Communist parts of the 
li 
Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Arabian Gulf region. 
In support of his views, Truman initiated an emergency request in March 
1947 for $400 million to aid Greece and Turkey, a request which came to be 
known as the Truman Doctrine. The Congress was reluctant to act on the request 
because the United States had never before entered into a formal assistance 
program with a foreign state during general peacetime conditions. However, 
Truman persisted, and the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947 was enacted, thus 
10 
O. Saruhan, "An Analysis of Foreign Military Sales Proceeds" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 
n  School, June 1989), 6. 
The Defense Institute  of Security Assistance Management,   The Management of Security 
Assistance, 14th Edition, 14. 






introducing the instrument of assistance as a significant factor in U.S. postwar 
foreign policy. 
2.       What is Security Assistance? 
It is often said that security assistance is an "umbrella" term. According to 
the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub. 1-02, published 
by the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, security assistance is defined as follows: 
Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) of 1976, as amended, and other related statues by which 
the United Sates provides defense articles, military training, and 
other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in 
furtherance on national policies and objectives. 
In general the United States offers security assistance to strengthen the 
national security of friendly nations, and to support existing or prospective 
democratic institutions and market economies. Since Second World War, security 
assistance has become an institutionalized and continuing program used to 
advance U.S. interests in a global environment. It is not just a short-range 
program; rather, it is a continuing program, the components and magnitude of 
which change each year due to U.S. national interest and foreign policy 
objectives. 
C.       EVOLUTION OF ARMS TRADE POLICIES: FROM REAGAN TO 
CLINTON 
1.        Background 
The arms-export policy of the United States has been subject to major 
shifts in the last twenty years. The "Nixon Doctrine" signaled a decreased 
willingness on the part of the United States to commit U.S. troops to the defense 
of friendly and allied states. It proclaimed that countries directly threatened 
should themselves take primary responsibility for their defense. The United 
States would, however, assist them in this task by supplying required military 
hardware. The doctrine was based on the consideration that using indigenous 
12 
13   Md- 
U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Pup 1-02) (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 327. 
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armed forces operating imported military equipment would be more cost- 
efficient than committing significant numbers of U.S. military personnel to the 
same task (not to mention the political problems of the United States 
Government caused by using U.S. military forces). Increased arms transfers 
would enable the United States to reduce military deployments without unduly 
endangering the positions of friends and allies. 
Another event that had a profound impact, not only on U.S. arms 
transfers but also on those of the other suppliers, was the oil price rise in 1974. 
This profoundly affected the balance of payments. The Nixon Doctrine and the 
oil price increase combined to exert strong upward pressures on the quantity of 
U.S. arms exports. 
At the same time, the U.S. Congress showed a strong desire to bring arms 
exports under closer control, first by an amendment (in 1974) to the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) Act, and later by the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. One year before the announcement of a new 
and more restrictive U.S. arms export policy by President Carter in 1977, 
Congress decided to downgrade or dissolve most U.S. Military Assistance 
Advisory Groups (MAAGs) stationed in the U.S. embassies in a large number of 
countries. Their tasks included representation (showing U.S. concern for the host 
country's security problems and giving advice), information (gathering 
information about the host country's needs, perceptions, attitudes), and 
management (assisting U.S. military assistance agencies in negotiations, helping 
commercial representatives of U.S. defense companies). Congress was concerned 
that military assistance personnel were generating demands for U.S. equipment 
either by assisting representatives of service agencies or commercial firms or by 
actively promoting the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment in their 
consultations with host military personnel, thus leading to a fait accompli for 
decision makers. 
In his campaign, President Carter promised to curb American arms 
exports, and within a few months after his inauguration he moved to fulfill at 
14 
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least part of his pledge. A Presidential Directive on Arms Transfer Policy (PD 
thirteen) was signed on 13 May 1977. It stated, inter alia, that: 
The United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an 
exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances 
where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to 
promote our security and the security of our close friends. 
2.        Reagan's Arms Transfer Policy 
The Reagan policy was not formally unveiled until 21 May 1981, when 
Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James 
L. Buckley addressed an Aerospace Industries Association meeting in 
Williamsburg, Virginia. Buckley affirmed that: 
This administration believes that arms transfer, judiciously applied, 
can complement and supplement our own defense effort and serve 
as a vital and constructive instrument of our foreign policy. 
Contending that the Carter restrictions had undermined the defenses of nations 
whose support was vital to America's own security, he argued that Washington 
must lift those restraints in order to strengthen the common defense. We must, 
Buckley declared, substitute "a healthy sense of self-preservation" for the 
"theology" of the Carter period. 
This outlook was subsequently incorporated into a new Presidential 
Directive on conventional arms transfer policy, signed by the president on 8 July 
1981. With this directive, the United Sates views the transfer of conventional 
arms and other defense articles and services as an essential element of its global 
20 
defense posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy. 
Reagan administration officials quickly rushed through a series of reforms 
to streamline the U.S. Government's arms supply system. First, they sought to 
provide quicker delivery of U.S. armaments to potential client states. Major FMS 
17 
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cases could take six years or more from the time an order was placed by a foreign 
government until the first weapon was actually delivered. Picking up on an idea 
that had been promoted by Texas Senator John Tower, the Pentagon set up a 
Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to speed the delivery of arms to U.S. 
allies. The fund would purchase and stockpile "frequently ordered pieces of U.S. 
equipment/' from machine guns to military trucks to helicopters, so that they 
could be shipped out as soon as a foreign government ordered them. The SDAF 
would also reduce the need for meeting FMS requirements through draw down 
or diversion of defense equipment from U.S. stock or new production. It would 
21 be supported to the tune of one billion dollars a year. 
In addition to shortening delivery times, the Reagan policy provided easy 
financing for foreign countries shopping for U.S. weapons. Grants and 
subsidized loans for the purchase of U.S. weapons were increased from $3.2 
billion to over $6.4 billion. 
Third, the Reagan State Department rescinded Carter's so-called "leprosy" 
letter, urging embassy personnel instead to provide U.S. arms manufacturers 
23 
with "all courtesies which would be provided to any other U.S. business." This 
new arms sales approach, as an editorial in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology commented, could best be characterized as a free enterprise one.^ 
The objectives of this new directive on conventional arms transfer policy, 
which superseded Presidential Directive Thirteen of 13 March 1977, are to: 
• Reinforce military capabilities to assist in the deterrence of aggression, 
especially from the USSR and its surrogates, and reduce the 
requirement for direct U.S. involvement in regional conflict. 
• Reinforce the perception of friends and allies that the U.S., as a partner, 
is also a reliable supplier with a measurable and enduring stake in the 
security of the recipient country. 
21 
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• Point out to potential enemies that the U.S. will not abandon its allies 
or friends or allow them to be militarily disadvantaged. 
• Improve the American economy by assuring a more stable defense 
production base, and by enhancing the balance of payments. However, 
this objective should not be construed to mean that the approval of the 
transfer of arms will be based solely or even primarily on economic 
considerations and gain. 
• Enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. military through improved 
possibilities of access to regional bases, ports, or facilities needed for 
the support of deployed forces during contingencies. Further, security 
assistance should be such as to improve the ability of the host nations 
to complement U.S. forces during deployments. 
• Strengthen the stability of a region and the international security of the 
countries therein by fostering a sense of a recipient nation's security 
and thereby its willingness to settle disputes amicably. Through this 
objective, it is held that a government which feels secure is more likely 
to cope with such challenges in a more progressive and enlightened 
manner. 
3. The Bush Administration 
Although George Bush spent most of the campaign distancing himself 
from any connection with arms sales issues, his victory in the November election 
was viewed as good news by arms exporting firms. The industry's confidence in 
the newly elected president's commitment to its agenda was based as much on 
Bush's resume and record as it was on anything he had actually said during the 
campaign. As the first former director of the CIA to be elected president, Bush 
was a good bet to support the kind of covert arms sales that had been such a 
prominent feature of the Reagan foreign policy. Not only was he Ronald 
Reagan's loyal Vice President, Bush had also helped to preside over the peak 
26 
years of the Nixon/Kissinger policy in the mid 1970s. 
The Bush administration faced various key events which had a significant 
impact on U.S. foreign policy and security assistance. These events included: 
25 
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• The December 1989 collapse of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent 
emergence of democracy in the former Warsaw Pact countries. 
• The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent 
January/February 1991 Operation Desert Storm which liberated 
Kuwait. 
• Middle East peace talks. 
• The December 1991 economic and political dismemberment of the 
USSR. 
27 
• The far reaching worldwide economic recession of 1991 and 1992. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 ultimately demonstrated 
the value of the past security assistance programs during the conduct of war and 
also the responsiveness of the security assistance community during the war. It 
also boosted the overall level of FMS agreements to $14.2 billion in FY1990 and a 
record $23.5 billion in FY 1991. The deployment, reception, and support of 
coalition forces in the Arabian Gulf was completed with comparative ease and 
benefited greatly from the over $15 billion in FMS construction agreements 
completed prior to FY 1990. Security assistance also provided for equipment and 
procedural compatibilities among many of the coalition forces through past sales 
of U.S. equipment and technical and professional training in U.S. military 
classrooms. The requirement for international military students to know English 
during their U.S. training contributed significantly to improve communication 
during the war. The war generated over 350 new FMS cases valued at about $12 
billion, the majority of which were immediately filled and delivered. The Gulf 
War  proved  that U.S.  military  systems,  though  expensive,  served  as  an 
2o 
exceptional marketing tool. 
The Bush administration's use of weapons as political tools did much 
more than prepare the way for U.S.-led military intervention in Kuwait. The 
trading of advanced U.S. weaponry for military cooperation in the Gulf War 
27 
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dramatically underscored the extent to which the initial Nixon/Kissinger 
concept of using arms sales in lieu of direct U.S. military intervention had come 
full circle to a policy of using arms sales to facilitate U.S. intervention. 
4.        The Clinton Administration: A New Direction 
Bill Clinton assumed the Presidency in 1993 with an already full plate: the 
humanitarian military mission in Somalia, the downward spiraling futility of 
Bosnia, a weakening U.S. economy and loss of predominance in the world's 
marketplace, the continued down-sizing of the U.S. military, and the continuing 
saga of the Middle East peace talks, to name only a few of the challenges. 
Despite these significant world problems, the Clinton administration's 
initial emphasis was on rebuilding the U.S. economy and on establishing a 
predominantly domestic agenda. In terms of the administration's foreign policy 
and national security interest, initially there was little departure from the 
previously stated goals of building democracy, promoting and minting peace, 
promoting economic growth and sustainable development, addressing global 
problems, and meeting urgent humanitarian needs. However, in order to 
accomplish these foreign policy goals, the Clinton administration laid as its 
bedrock the domestic strength of the U.S. through a number of internal and 
external measures which both directly and indirectly affected security 
assistance. 
In what is now referred to as the "Christopher Cable," President Clinton's 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, reiterated a previous policy encouraging 
overseas embassies to actively assist U.S. marketing efforts overseas. This was 
interpreted to also include U.S. civilian defense contractors in the pursuit of 
direct commercial sales    (DCS) and foreign military sales (FMS) of defense 
32 
articles, services, and training overseas. 
With the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
came the desire to attain peace dividends in the form of a reduced defense 
budget and the rapid downsizing of the U.S. military force structure. The savings 
29 
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to be gained would help to fund certain domestic programs, such as reducing the 
budget deficit and funding a health care reform package. One significant security 
assistance program fell to defense cuts: the Special Defense Acquisition Fund. 
The SDAF was not recapitalized for FY 1994 with the intent that new items 
would not be added to the inventory, that money from sales would be returned 
to the U.S. Treasury, and that once an item was exhausted from inventory, it 
would not be reordered. It is anticipated that the SDAF could be totally defunct 
by FY 1998.33 
However, FY 1993 ended on a bright note in terms of the positive impact 
of FMS cash sales on the U.S. economy. Due primarily to major defense 
equipment sales to countries in the Arabian Gulf, signed cases for FMS sales 
topped $33 billion. These sales kept U.S. production lines open and defense 
industry employment up, especially for the great number of companies involved 
34 
in the production of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and the Ml A2 main battle tank. 
In February 1995, President Clinton signed the Conventional Arms Policy, 
which was classified. Its goals are to ensure that the U.S. military forces can 
continue to enjoy technical advantages over potential adversaries; to help allies 
and friends deter or defend themselves against aggression while promoting 
interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations are required; to 
promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interest while preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems; 
to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, 
democratization, and other U.S. foreign policy objectives; and to enhance the 
ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and 
maintain long-term military technological superiority at lower costs. 
33 
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D.       U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
According to the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) document on 
security assistance, the primary objectives of security assistance are to assist 
countries in preserving their independence; promote regional security; help 
obtain access, overflight, transit, and forward basing rights; contribute to 
interoperability among military forces; insure access to critical raw materials; and 
36 
provide a medium for increasing U.S. influence. 
For the United States, seven different programs can be regarded as part of 
security assistance if both the concessionary and nonconcessionary programs are 
included. In descending order of concessionality, from grant to essentially 
commercial programs: 
• Military Assistance Program (MAP), which was formally merged with 
the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program in FY 1990, provides 
defense articles and services, other than training, to eligible 
governments on a grant basis. The Congress appropriated $3,918 
million for FY 1994 for this program, or about 61 percent of the total 
budget for security assistance. 
• International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 
provides training to foreign military and certain civilians on a grant 
basis, in the United Sates or abroad. It accounts for about 1 percent of 
total security assistance, and the JCS state: "This program has great 
potential for influencing foreign governments, whose representatives 
are trained by U.S. personnel and exposed to the United States, its 
people, culture, and policies. Frequently, students later assume senior 
leadership and management roles in their governments." This 
program has shown remarkable success over the years in building 
country-to-country relations. 
• Economic Support Fund (ESF) is administered by the Agency for 
International Development (AID) and is considered part of security 
assistance. This program is often used to support a country's balance of 
payments and to offset payments due on FMS loans. For FY 1994 the 
Congress appropriated $2,365 million for ESF, or about 37 percent of 
all security-related aid. 
36 
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• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) authorizes assistance to friendly 
countries and international organizations for the purpose of 
peacekeeping. Historically, funding under this statute has for the most 
part been limited to support of the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 
and the Multinational Force and Observation in the Sinai (MFO). With 
the changing international security environment, the number of 
situations requiring peacekeeping operations has risen in the early 
1990s. Consequently, the Congress appropriated $75 million for FY 
1994, or about 1 percent amount of the total budget for security 
assistance. 
• The Nonproliferation And Disarmament Fund is a new element in the 
security assistance budget. Following the collapse of the USSR, 
disarmament of the four nuclear former Soviet Union states (Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) has moved to the forefront of the 
U.S. national security agenda. To help meet these needs, for FY 1994 
the Congress appropriated $10 million for this program, or about 1 
percent of the total budget for security assistance. 
• The Foreign Military Sales cash sales program allows qualified 
governments to purchase defense equipment, services, and training 
from the United States on a direct cash basis. At the end of 1994 more 
than 140 countries were authorized to use this program. FMS cash has 
no budget implications. 
• Commercial sales of defense articles and services by private firms to 
foreign governments, with the approval of the Office of Munitions 
control in the State Department can also be considered part of security 
assistance. Commercial sales have no budget implications. 
E.        PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY IN THE ARABIAN GULF 
1.        Background 
Early in 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised the specter 
that the Soviets were seeking control over the world's oil lifeline, President 
37 
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Carter asserted that the U.S. would resist any attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Gulf region. 
While the Carter Doctrine was aimed principally at blocking the perceived 
threat of Soviet expansionism, it was the reality of Iran's and Iraq's search for 
hegemony and regional dominance which finally drew a U.S. military response - 
first through protection of Kuwaiti oil shipments during the Iran-Iraq War and, 
then, significantly, the coalition effort to liberate Kuwait and defeat Iraqi 
aggression. Today, the U.S. recognizes that the greatest potential danger to 
regional security lies in the threats which may come from either Iran or Iraq. 
These states pose different challenges. Their threats require different policies as 
have been detailed by National Security Advisor Lake in his recent Foreign 
39 
Affairs article, "Backlash States." 
2.        U.S. Strategy 
The basic strategic principle for the United States in the Gulf, as defined in 
the Lake article, is to protect critical American interests in the security of its 
friends and in the free flow of oil at stable prices. In pursuing that balance, the 
U.S. concentrates on two sets of key objectives: limiting the ability of both Iran 
and Iraq to threaten regional stability and bolstering the defensive capabilities of 
U.S. friends in the region - individually, in tandem with their regional partners, 
and in concert with the U.S. and other friendly outside powers. 
The United States has the means to check immediate, overt threats. Iraq is 
constrained by international sanctions which were first affirmed by the UN. Iran 
is weakened by war and cannot directly challenge the U.S. Navy. No superpower 
41 
is urging on either one or extending a protective umbrella. 
The situation is not static; Iraq remains a regional power with a long-term 
potential to threaten regional and U.S. interests, but it is subject to an extensive 
and highly rigorous set of international restrictions on its freedom of action. The 
U.S. stance toward Iraq is clear: It must fully comply with all relevant UN 
38 
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Security Council resolutions and with the measures taken by the international 
42 
coalition to enforce and monitor them. 
As for Iran, the United States has deep and serious concerns about its 
behavior in its quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the 
means of their delivery; the continued involvement of the Iranian Government in 
terrorism and assassination worldwide; its support for violent opposition to the 
Arab-Israeli peace process; threats and subversive activities against its neighbors; 
43 
and its dismal human rights record at home. 
The policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian Government but at 
inducing Iran to change its behavior in these areas. The U.S. seeks increased 
international economic pressure to persuade Iran that it cannot expect to enjoy 
normal state-to-state relations as long as it violates basic standards of 
international behavior. This means working with other countries to deny Iran 
access to technology and other means by which it can facilitate the pursuit of 
policies of destabilization, terrorism, and the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
3.        Security Cooperation 
One of the clear lessons of the past decade has been that containment of 
regional threats alone is not sufficient. The U.S. also needs to work with its 
friends in the region to develop a strong regional deterrent to those who would 
threaten its security or stability. The U.S. approach to bolster the security of its 
friends in the area is by: 
• Encouraging the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to 
work more closely together on collective defense and security 
arrangements. 
• Helping individual GCC countries meet their legitimate defense 
requirements, including arms sales that increase their capabilities to 
conduct coordinated operations in U.S. and other GCC forces. 
• Working to strengthen its own ability to act quickly in the region by 
maintaining strong forces there, by prepositioning vital equipment and 
42 
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material, and by concluding defense access agreements with the GCC 
states. 
The United States' goal is to complement, not replace, the Gulf states' own 
collective security efforts. The U.S. does not intend to station troops permanently 
anywhere in the region. The objective is to increase regional stability, deter 
threats, and raise the threshold at which direct U.S. military action would be 
needed; that is, to reduce the likelihood that the U.S. and its allies would have to 
46 
fight to repel aggression. 
The United States also recognizes that equipment alone cannot address 
the requirement for regional security. Small populations, absorption issues, and 
the need - in this era of lower oil prices - for the Gulf states to budget carefully 
for their military procurement, all lead to the conclusion that the appropriate 
47 
response to Gulf security requirements is a diverse one. For that reason, the 
U.S. particularly welcomed the decision of the GCC summit meeting in Riyadh 
in 1993 to endorse a number of recommendations of the GCC defense ministers 
for enhanced GCC cooperation and coordination. These include, for example, 
48 joint efforts in the area of air defense command and control. The United States 
believes in and has undertaken with its friends in the area, continuing measures 
aimed at improved GCC cooperation that form an important component of 
enhanced deterrence for the region. 
F.        THE PLACE OF THE U.S. IN THE ARMS MARKET 
The makeup of the arms market itself has changed. Once dominated by 
the   U.S.   and   USSR   and   a   few   lesser   suppliers   in  Europe,   it   is   now 
50 
overwhelmingly dominated by one nation: the United States. A 29 July 1994 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for Congress, "Conventional Arms 
Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993," shows that for the fourth straight year 
45 
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the United States continues to wrest from Russian and European suppliers a 
greater share of a shrinking global arms market, with U.S. arms agreements in 
1993 accounting for nearly 75 percent of all Third World weapon deals, up from 
just 21 percent five years ago. 
An industry spokesman pointed out that the main reason for U.S. 
dominance of the arms market is the decline of its competitors. "U.S. exports of 
military equipment have been relatively constant for at least the last decade," 
says Joel L. Johnson, Vice President for International Affairs of the Aerospace 
Industries Association of America. What happened is the world transfers of arms 
dropped from about $61.5 billion in 1988 down to around $22.4 billion in 1993, 
52 
giving the United States a bigger percentage of the total. 
For nations that can't afford brand-new weaponry, the Pentagon is 
literally giving away older but still lethal pieces of its cold war arsenal. Pentagon 
officials say such gifts help nurture closer ties between U.S. and foreign militaries 
and save millions of dollars that the Defense Department would otherwise have 
53 
to pay to scrap arms. 
U.S. arms producers have stepped up their export efforts as a way to 
survive Pentagon budget cuts. Defense Department orders for new weapons 
have fallen by half since 1988, reaching a new low of $44 billion in 1994. 
U.S. arms exports, meanwhile, have remained fairly steady, averaging 
around $12 billion a year. Critics of arms sales say that at a time of shrinking 
markets the United States is setting a bad example to the rest of the world by 
hawking its lethal weapons. Overseas industry representatives respond that 
conventional arms are legitimate export products that serve the interests of both 
the United States and their customers, who are carefully screened through the 
55 JO 
federal licensing process. 
After reviewing the U.S. security assistance and tracking the changes in its 
policies under the different administrations, a logical follow-on is to understand 
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how the U.S. arms sales business are carried out. The next chapter will focus on 
the process of the primary element of the U.S. security assistance, the foreign 
military sales. In addition, the direct commercial sales, the FMS competitor, will 
be explored. 
G.       SUMMARY 
The focus of this chapter has been on the policies of U.S. security 
assistance which has been viewed differently by different administrations. 
Security assistance has been and still remains an important instrument of foreign 
policy. Arms transfers and related services have reached enormous dimensions, 
involving most of the world's nations, either as a seller/provider or 
buyer/recipient. 
The period from 1945 until 1991 saw the emergence of the two 
superpowers and their competition for larger spheres of influence. The Truman 
Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, was established in an effort to stem 
the flow of communism, and set the pattern for security assistance that 
developed for four decades. 
The policy of containment began under Truman and had an impact on 
U.S.-USSR relations during every administration since Truman's. Containment 
also left a heavy imprint on the U.S. security assistance policy. It became a factor 
in the determination of who would receive aid, what type of assistance and how 
much would be furnished, and whether it would be provided through grant or 
sale. 
For the United States, seven different programs can be regarded as part of 
security assistance if both the concessionary and nonconcessionary programs are 
included. Growing economic difficulties and recession-induced increases in 
unemployment and company failures have produced a political environment in 
the U.S. in which there is no support for foreign assistance programs of any kind. 
In this environment, the Administration will be hard pressed to induce 
Congressional support for the funding of the U.S. security assistance programs. 
However, the marketing efforts to support cash sales of U.S. Defense articles 
oversees will intensify. 
The United States, through the development of strong ties with the GCC 
states, seeks to ensure that those states enjoy security and stability so that the 
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international community preserves its access to vital natural resources of the 
region. 
According to the "Conventional Arms Transfer to the Third World, 1986- 
1993" CRS report for the Congress, the United States is overwhelmingly 
dominating the arms export market. U.S. arms agreements in 1993 had accounted 
for 75 percent of all Third World weapon deals, up from 21 percent in 1988. 
25 
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III. U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
If a foreign country chooses to buy military equipment or services through 
the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, an elaborate system of U.S. 
Government involvement is automatically set in motion. The government is 
involved in any military sale, including direct commercial sales (DCS). Any sale 
must have an export license from the Office of Munitions Control, and for any 
sale over certain threshold levels the administration must make notification to 
the U.S.  Congress  in advance.  But since an FMS  sale  involves  the  U.S. 
56 
Government as the contracting agent, the process is even more complex. 
Military sales can take years to consummate. Even for relatively simple 
and inexpensive weapons systems, countries can spend months selecting the 
item, determining the amount of follow-on assistance to purchase, arranging 
financing, obtaining U.S. Government approval, and awaiting production and 
delivery. 
This chapter attempts to explore the two methods through which an 
eligible customer can purchase defense articles, the FMS and DCS. The FMS will 
be described starting from the pre-planning phase to the case closure phase. 
Then, the type of support the customer can expect from the U.S. once the defense 
article is delivered will be addressed. Finally, the financial aspects that govern 
the FMS will be explained. Legislative and administrative publications will be 
the basis for the presented information. 
With respect to the DCS, the FMS competitor, the description will be 
limited. The reason for this limitation is because DCS is not characterized by a 
specific execution procedure. DCS is based on the agreement between the buyer 
and the seller on the way to conduct their business, which can be as simple as 
opening a Letter of Credit or as complicated as using a legal contract. 
56 
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2.        Definition 
FMS, the largest program element of the overall security assistance 
program, stands for foreign military sales, which are government-to-government 
sales of defense articles and services. Through the FMS program, which is 
conducted under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, 
the U.S. DoD sells military equipment and services to foreign governments and 
international organizations. The DoD may order and buy the equipment from 
private firms, manufacture the equipment in government facilities, draw it from 
57 
available stocks, or in certain circumstances draw it from U.S. military units. 
Defense articles are commodities such as weapons systems, munitions, 
materials,  supplies,  or goods used for the purpose of providing military 
5ö 
assistance, not including merchant vessels. 
Defense Services include any service, test, inspection, repair, training, 
publication, technical or other assistance or defense information used for the 
purposes of making military sales. Training includes either formal or informal 
instruction of foreign students in the U.S. or abroad by officers or employees of 
the U.S., contract technicians, or contractors. It also includes correspondence 
courses, technical, educational, or informational publications and media of all 
types, training aids, orientation, training exercises, and military advice to foreign 
military units and forces. 
FMS are administered by the Secretary of Defense and shall only be 
approved when they are consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United 
States. 
57 
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B.        FMS PROCESS 
1.        Forward Planning 
Even before specific requests are made by a purchasing country, the U.S. 
may be involved in forward planning, in order to help determine the needs of 
the buying country and the budget and procurement issues relating to the U.S. 
There are three separate "planning tracks," described as the "country track," 
"budget track," and "procurement track." The country track would involve the 
regional departments of the State and Defense Departments, the Operation 
Branch of Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Commanders of the 
Unified Commands of the Armed Forces responsible for the area involved, and 
the Security Assistance Office (SAO) in the affected country. The "budget track" 
involves DSAA's Plans Branch, the Office of Management and Budget, and at the 
State Department, the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science 
and Technology (State/T) and Political-Military Affairs (State/PM). The 
"procurement track" includes State/PM, the individual services, DSAA 
Operations and Plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Disclosure 
61 
Policy Committee. 
The actual planning is carried out by two types of groups: the "Country 
Team" or Security Assistance Office for the country, and the "Washington Team" 
which may be a consultative or survey team dispatched for a particular reason, 
or associated with a Joint Military Commission. All of the various agencies and 
players interact with each other in the planning. 
A key planning instrument is the Annual Integrated Assessment for 
Security Assistance (AIASA), prepared by the Country Team. Other planning 
documents include Consolidated Data Reports (CDRs), containing the AIASA 
information in abbreviated form for use in the Congressional Presentation 
Document (CPD), produced as part of the budget process each year and 
outlining in general detail what will be required for a given country in the form 
of security assistance. For selected countries, a Security Assistance Defense 
Analysis Paper may be prepared annually. 
61 
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2. Eligibility 
Any country desiring to buy or lease defense articles or services—whether 
FMS or commercial sales—must first meet the eligibility requirements detailed 
under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA). 
The ACEA (Section Three) states that no defense articles or services may 
be sold or leased by the U.S. Government to any country or international 
organization unless: 
• The President finds that the furnishing of defense articles and defense 
services to such country or international organization will strengthen 
the security of the U.S. and promote world peace. 
• The country or organization has agreed not to transfer the item 
without the President's consent. 
• The country or organization has agreed to maintain the security of the 
item. 
•   The  country or organization is otherwise  eligible,  i.e.,  no  other 
restrictions make it ineligible. 
Each year, in the Congressional Presentation Document for security assistance 
programs, the President submits a list of all countries that have been found to be 
64 
eligible for arms sales or leases under criterion above. 
3. Initiating a Request 
Assuming that a country is eligible, the approved channels for submitting 
a Letter of Request (LOR) vary according to whether the foreign country is 
interested in Significant Military Equipment (SME), defined as: 
Articles for which special export controls are warranted because of 
their capacity for substantial military utility or capability. 
or Major Defense Equipment (MDE), which is defined as: 
64 
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A SME and for which the U.S. Government has incurred either a 
nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50 million or 
which has a total production cost of over $200 million. 
Requests for SMEs or MDEs must be sent to State/PM — the division 
which includes the Office of Munitions Control — and also to the DSAA, the 
Pentagon's main implementation body for all foreign security assistance. For all 
other FMS, non-SME, the requests are transmitted directly to the relevant DoD 
u       u ■    65 branch or service. 
In the case of Bahrain, all the requests are transmitted to the Office of 
Military Cooperation (OMC) at the U.S. Embassy, which then transmits them to 
the appropriate channels in the United States. 
4. Type of Request 
After the initial request is received, there are several possible approaches. 
The buyer may request either preliminary information data known as Planning 
and Review (P&R) data, which offers a rough estimate and information about the 
price and the availability, or more specific and detailed Price and Availability 
(P&A) data, which offers price estimates of the cost involved and the speed of 
delivery available, or the buyer may directly request the preparation of a Letter 
66 
of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). 
5. Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
The usual document used for the actual sale transaction is DoD Form 1513 
(DD Form 1513), which lists the items or services, estimated costs, terms and 
conditions of the sale. 
FMS cases can be divided into Defined Order Cases, Blanket Order Cases, 
and Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSAs). A Defined 
Order case is one in which the items, services or training to be provided are 
stated explicitly on the LOA. The Blanket Order FMS cases is an agreement that 
specifies that the foreign country may acquire a specific category of material or 
65 
Dunn, "The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," 9. 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management,  The Management of Security 









services without a specific listing. The CLSSAs provide logistics support at the 
67 
depot level on a continuous basis. 
The LOA is written by the implementing service. In the Army, this is 
usually the Material Readiness Command; in the Navy, the Security Assistance 
Division of the Office of the CNO, and in the Air Force, the Air Staff Directorate 
68 
of International Programs. 
6. Congressional Notification 
Congress has required a wide range of reporting on arms sales including 
annual and periodic reports on overall transfers, and prior notification of major 
69 
sales of equipment or services. 
In 1976, under the International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of that year, Congress was given the power to block major sales of 
equipment or services provided it passed a concurrent resolution of disapproval 
within thirty days of notification of sale. The thresholds above which Congress 
must be given prior notification of sale are: 
• Any LOA with the value of $50 million or more. 
• Any design and construction services for $20 million or more. 
• Any major defense equipment for $14 million or more. 
The President may, under the AECA, certify that an emergency exists and 
avoid the thirty-day congressional approval process, but this is rarely done. 
7. Acceptance 
If the foreign buyer finds the offer acceptable, then the purchaser must 
complete and sign the DD 1513 before the expiration date which is sixty days 
from the date the offer issued. This is the usual procedure, because of the degree 
of coordination put into the case beforehand. There have been instances where 
r 71 
an LOA was issued but financial or other terms were subsequently rejected. 
67 
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Any required initial deposit — this will have been specified in the DD 
1513 — must also be provided before the expiration date in U.S. dollars. If the 
purchaser wishes to extend the expiration dates, a full review is required by the 
72 
preparing agency to insure that all price and other data remains valid. 
8. Implementation 
After receiving the initial deposit, Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS) releases the obligational authority (O/A) to the cognizant DoD 
component. The O/A is evidence that proper acceptance, including cash deposit, 
has been received and the case may be implemented. The cognizant component 
may then prepare "case directives" that direct and coordinate the case 
implementation process. 
The means by which the U.S. Government fulfills the requirements of the 
FMS program depend on the nature of the material and services being furnished. 
A typical program involves the procurement of items from government stocks. 
The complete system is composed of both contractor-furnished and government- 
furnished equipment, subsystems, and material. FMS requirements may be 
consolidated with U.S. Government requirements or placed on a separate 
contract, whichever is more expedient and cost effective. 
The actual procurement and supply action for the FMS program are 
carried out by U.S. Government procurement and logistics activities in the same 
manner, and by using largely the same internal management organizations as for 
U.S. Government programs. The implementing agencies may establish separate 
offices or positions within their organizations to provide overall surveillance of 
the FMS program, and they serve as an interface with other organizations 
involved in managing the program. 
9. Closure 
A FMS case is considered closed when DFAS issues a final statement of 
account (DD 645) to the customer. DFAS can issue a final bill only after the 
implementing agency (IA) has submitted to DFAS a case closure certificate. The 
72 ™  Ibid. 73 
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IA and DFAS will close a case usually after a lengthy process called case 
reconciliation. Case reconciliation should include the customer as a major 
participant in order to ensure that all supply and financial transaction have been 
resolved with DFAS as well as the IA. The DoD case manager is the primary 
individual responsible for case closure. 
Current policy states that all cases should be reported closed to DFAS 
within twenty-four months of becoming supply complete, unless there are 
significant   case   procurement   actions   pending   final   liquidation   or   final 
77 
disbursement. 
The difference between the delivered value of the item and the final 
contract price, normally a small percentage of the final contract cost, will not be 
finalized until all deliverables on a long running contract are completed. 
Therefore, a customer may end up with all material delivered against a major 
procurement case but case closure will be many years away pending relatively 
small final disbursements. 
C.        INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT 
The DoD logistics system is designed to provide support throughout the 
life cycle of weapon system to ensure maximum capability. The goal is to 
provide the greatest support for the least cost. Decisions regarding which repair 
parts to stock in order to maintain the highest operational readiness start with 
the initial planning phases of a new weapon system and continue during its 
operational life. For the purpose of foreign military sales, the life cycle 
management of weapons system can be divided into two phases: initial and 
follow-on support. 
1.        Initial Support 
Initial support is provided to the purchaser before or at the same time the 
system or major item is delivered in order to ensure the successful introduction 
and operation of a new system into the customer's inventory. 
76 
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The level of initial support is based on a number of factors. Some of those 
are the average operation per hour per month, number of repair locations, and 
the maintenance concept. A driving force in determining the amount of initial 
support to be provided for a particular weapon system for a customer country is 
often the amount of money that the country is willing to invest. In general, initial 
80 
support is provided for a twelve to twenty-four month period. 
2.        Follow-On Support 
Follow-on support is normally defined as that support provided on a day- 
to-day basis subsequent to the initial support period and prior to removal of the 
end item from the inventory. Follow-on support negotiations are generally 
started during the weapon system acquisition phase to accommodate 
administrative and production lead time. 
One option available for follow-on support is through Cooperative 
Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSAs). The CLSSA is considered by 
the DoD as the most effective means to replenish the in-country stock of spares 
and repair parts which were initially furnished with end items of equipment. 
Also the DoD considers it as the most responsive means through which 
authorized repair parts may be obtained. 
The CLSSA arrangement requires the country to make a financial 
investment in the DoD logistics system to establish an equity representative of its 
anticipated support requirements. The country, in conjunction with the 
recommendation of the system program managers, identifies by stock number 
and quantity those commonly used items which the country anticipates will be 
required over a given period to support a weapon system/major end item. This 
list is known as the equity list, because of the customer investment in the U.S. 
supply system. The investment permits the U.S. service to augment its stocks in 
anticipation of the country's actual demands. The CLSSA is used only for 
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which were either not provided with the initial support package or which are 
83 
beyond repair. 
The material purchased with the country's cash investment is commingled 
with U.S. DoD stocks and is not physically separated or otherwise identified in 
the service's inventory records. In return for this investment, the country is 
entitled to receive support from DoD stocks equal to that provided U.S. forces 
assigned the same Force Activity Designator (FAD). 
Once an investment has been used to augment DoD stocks and a country 
desires to actually withdraw material for use in country, the country's payment 
for those items which it requisitions will provide funds which allow U.S. 
Government to restore stock levels to support that particular country in the 
85 
future under the arrangement. 
D.       PRICING AND FUNDS MANAGEMENT 
1.        FMS Pricing 
The methodology employed in developing an FMS price depends upon 
whether that price is to be placed on an LOA as a cost estimate or whether it is 
the price which is later reported in the billing system as the result of the 
constructive delivery of an article or service. The prices entered on an LOA are 
estimates of the expected costs of articles and services to be delivered some time 
•        t        r 86 in the future. 
The objective of these estimates, developed using cost analysis techniques, 
is to provide the FMS purchaser with an accurate prediction of a future cost. 
Prices entered into the billing system represent the actual cost of articles and 
services which have been delivered to FMS purchasers. These actual prices are 
based on the cost of the article at the time it is dropped from inventory, or the 
wage or salary rate at the time the service is performed. In the case of articles 
coming from new procurement, the costs reported will be those incurred for 
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However, the exact final cost of major procurements may not be 
determined until the total contracts for all systems obtained under such 
procurements are completed. Consequently, estimates will be entered into the 
billing system to be replaced by the actual costs when they are determined. 
The AECA, as amended, requires the U.S. Government to determine and 
recover all costs relating to FMS except where authority exists for cost reduction 
or waiver. The LOA terms and conditions reflect the fact that the U.S. 
Government, in procuring and furnishing the items specified in the body of the 
LOA, does so on a nonprofit basis. 
According to Sections twenty-one and twenty-two of the AECA, FMS 
agreements must recover costs as follows: 
• In the case of defense articles not intended to be replaced at the time a 
sales agreement is entered into: not less than the actual value thereof. 
• In the case of defense articles to be replaced: the estimated cost of the 
replacement of such article, including the contract or production costs 
less any depreciation in the value of such article. 
• In the case of the sale of a defense service: the full cost to U.S. 
Government of furnishing such service. 
• In the case of new procurement: the full amount of such contract 
(which will insure the U.S. Government against any loss on the 
contract); plus, 
• Appropriate charges for: 
• Administration services, calculated on an average percentage 
basis. 
• A proportionate amount of any nonrecurring costs of research, 








• Ordinary inventory losses associated with the sale from stock of 
defense articles that are being stored at the expense of the 
purchaser. 
2.        FMS Funds Management 
The administration of the FMS program involves the management of 
substantial amounts of funds. The fact that FMS operates under a legislatively 
mandated "no-loss" concept and an administratively mandated "no-gain" policy 
enforces the requirement for effective financial planning and accountability, and 
has caused the creation of FMS-peculiar data collecting and reporting systems. 
The conceptual big picture for the funds flow process starts with the 
United States Government placing financial requirements on the Foreign 
Purchaser. These requirements are generally of two forms: (1) the initial deposit 
requirement, if applicable, which is reflected in the LOA and (2) quarterly 
payment requirements which are contained in the estimated payment schedule 
of the LOA and subsequently incorporated in the DFAS issued quarterly FMS 
billing statement, DD Form 645. The DD Form 645 reflects performance against 
FMS orders as reported by the implementing agencies based on the monthly 
delivery transactions. 
The purchaser must respond by providing the funds requested. The 
purchaser normally has two sources of financing: cash and U.S. Government 
credit (i.e., grants or loans). From the perspective of the U.S. Government, cash 
financing by the purchaser means the absence of U.S. Government grants or 
loans. 
In making cash payments, which is always in the form of United States 
dollars, a purchaser may pay DFAS directly by wire transfer or by check. The 
payments are received into the FMS Trust Fund Account for which DFAS has 
accounting responsibility. 
The DoD components having implementation responsibility for a given 
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authority (EA) from DFAS at the appropriate times. OA and EA may be 
requested and accounted for by one of two methods: the direct citation of the 
93 
FMS trust fund method or the reimbursable method. 
At the time of case closure, there may be funds left over on an FMS case 
(i.e., funds which are in excess of the final case value). Also, purchaser funds are 
occasionally received at DFAS prior to receipt of an accepted LOA, or funds are 
received at DFAS that are not identified to a particular case. These excess funds 
and unidentified funds may be retained in a holding account pending the 
purchaser's instructions. The purchaser's funds may be retained in the holding 
account or returned at the purchaser's request, provided there are no collection 
delinquencies for other FMS cases. 
The holding account is also used by DFAS for other purposes. For 
example, crossleveling transactions, Interest Bearing Account Drawdowns, MAP 
Merger Funds, Buybacks, and Credit Funds may be processed through the 
holding account, as applicable. 
E.        DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES 
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are another element of the security 
assistance program. A direct commercial sales licensed under the AECA is a sale 
made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. Unlike the procedure 
employed for FMS, direct commercial sales transactions are not administered by 
the DoD and do not involve a government-to-government agreement. Rather, 
the U.S. Governmental "control" is accomplished through licensing by the Office 
of Defense Trade Control in the Department of State. Commercially licensed 
sales are authorized under Section Thirty-eight of the AECA. 
Both the contractor-to-government DCS and the government-to- 
government FMS have been designed to achieve a common result—the 
enhancement of mutual security objectives through the provision of U.S. military 
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As for FMS, under DCS congressional certification is required before the 
issuance of any export license for MDE in excess of $14 million or other defense 
96 
articles/ services in excess of $50 million. 
Eligible governments may request contract administration and contract 
audit functions normally provided by DoD, for DCS purchases. This service is 
normally authorized and reimbursed through a blanket order LOA between the 
foreign purchaser and the U.S. Government. 
In the past, eligible countries were able to use foreign military financing 
(FMF) funds to pay for direct commercial contract with U.S. suppliers. But, since 
1993, this has not been case due to some auditing problems faced by the DoD. 
Nations buying military equipment from the U.S. have shown an 
increasing preference for working with the FMS system rather than buying 
through government approved commercial channels for several factors. The 
next chapter, Bahrain Defense Force and the FMS, shall address those factors 
from the perspective of the buyer. 
F.        SUMMARY 
The process of FMS management follows a logical sequence of steps over 
a prescribed timeline. Depending on the nature of the foreign government's 
requirements, a purchaser may request either Price and Availability (P&A) data 
or a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). P&A data is usually needed by the 
foreign government for rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates on prices 
and delivery timeframes. The LOA, also known as an "FMS Case," is a 
contractual document that provides the purchasing country with all the 
information required to purchase not only the material or service, but also all the 
ancillary support needed for full functional operation. The LOA, upon 
acceptance, is returned to the cognizant military department and to DFAS with 
96 
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the required initial payment. DFAS then provides obligation authority to the 
cognizant military department. 
A case is considered delivered or supply complete when all articles and 
services contracted for on the LOA have been delivered or performed by the 
implementing agency. Case closure is then undertaken. A case is considered 
closed when, in addition to final delivery or performance, all financial 
transactions, including collections, have been completed and the customer has 
received a final statement of account for the case. 
Although available through other sources, in many instances the 
purchasing country prefers to use the U.S. logistics support system for its own 
forces. One option available for follow-on support is through Cooperative 
Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSAs). The CLSSA is considered by 
the DoD as the most effective means to replenish the in-country stock of spares 
and repair parts which were initially furnished with end items of equipment. The 
DoD considers it as the most responsive means through which authorized repair 
parts may be obtained. 
The LOA is the primary document used to transmit FMS prices to the 
purchasing country. Elements used in calculating FMS prices may include, but 
are not limited to, the cost of the item; nonrecurring RDT&E and production 
costs; contract administration costs; accessorial charges; and administrative 
charges. 
In the case of new procurement for items which are usually delivered 
directly, pricing is established to recover full contract cost plus applicable 
surcharges. 
For a case to be implemented, IAs must request obligational authority, 
and the OA in turn must be passed for DFAS to the applicable IA. OA allows 
items to be released from DoD inventories and contracts to be awarded on the 
purchaser's behalf. Expenditure authority must be requested by the IA from 
DFAS in order to pay contractor invoices. 
100 
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Nations buying military equipment from the U.S. have shown an 
increasing preference for working with the FMS system rather than buying 
through government approved commercial channels for several reasons. 
42 
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IV. BAHRAIN DEFENSE FORCE AND THE FMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The management of FMS programs and cases, like the concept of 
"management" itself, is often regarded by some as more of an art than a 
101 
science. In managing the FMS, Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) follows the same 
universal management principles as does the United States. 
It is not an understatement to say that FMS has a language of its own, and 
that is why in BDF, the execution of FMS is somewhat different than other 
programs. 
Focusing on FMS execution in BDF, this chapter shall start with a 
background of the State of Bahrain, its defense forces, and their role in the Gulf 
War. Second, the evolution of FMS in the BDF will be explained. Third, the BDF's 
in-house mechanism used to deal with the FMS will be explored. Finally, from 
the point of view of the BDF, the advantages of both the FMS and DCS will be 
explained. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. The State of Bahrain 
Bahrain's identity in the region is special. It was the first Gulf state to 
discover oil and to have an-oil based economy in the 1930s. It was the first state 
in the region to use demographic studies in economic planning and to provide 
extensive statistical information and make it available to private business. It was 
also the first Gulf regional base for scheduled airline services and has developed 
over the last three decades as the center for regional finance, duty-free port 
legislation and industrial areas. It leads the region in international trade, patents 
and intellectual property rights legislation, which is based on western patents 
laws. It was the first country in the Middle East to install a satellite 
communication system. Its position as a center for some of the world's most 
102 
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Bahrain aims to diversify its sources of national revenue through 
industrial expansion and diversification. Thus, the further development of 
Bahrain's industrial and tourist sectors have become top priorities in the face of 
103 
dwindling oil reserves. Bahrain also wishes to diversify its export markets. 
Current government policies also include job creation, economic incentives in 
key areas, privatization of government firms and cost cutting measures. 
Bahrain's strategic location in the middle of the Arabian Gulf, and its 
strong links and relation with its western allies that have been built over the 
years, has become a sensitive issue for the government. The government has 
been criticized for the relationship, making the government pay more attention 
to external critics than it would if left in peace to form alliances and relationships 
with Bahrain's friends. 
To protect the sovereignty of the State of Bahrain, and to play its role in 
the stability in the region, the ruler of Bahrain issued a decree that announced the 
formation of Bahrain Defense Force in 1968. 
2. Bahrain Defense Force Evolution 
BDF was formed three years before Bahrain received its independence 
from the United Kingdom (U.K.). Since that time, the Government of Bahrain 
has continuously supported the development of the BDF. BDF's development 
plan started by sending a number of officers to Sandhurst Military College in 
U.K. to be trained in the art of leading the forces to defend the country. 
During the seventies, BDF capabilities were limited. BDF's equipment 
consisted of a few French wheeled armored vehicles, British 105 mm guns, four 
BO-105 helicopters used mainly for patrol missions, and a small number of naval 
boats equipped with short range small caliber guns that provided limited 
defensive capabilities. 
During the eighties, the BDF grew. Units of the BDF have received M60A3 
tanks, 155 mm guns, M113 armored vehicles, Stinger missile systems, missile 
boats equipped with anti-ship missiles and air defense capability, AB-212 
helicopters, and F-5 fighters. 
In 1994, the BDF celebrated its Silver Jubilee. On this occasion all BDF 
systems and equipment were displayed in a convoy that extended miles. The 
103 




Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS) and the F-16 fighters, Black Hawk and 
Cobra helicopters, SINCGARS radios, and Naval helicopters equipped with over 
the horizon targeting were added to BDF's capabilities. 
Furnishing the units with the different systems did not take place without 
building the required support facilities. In 1990 a first class air base was opened 
in the southern part of the island. This base, which was designed by the U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, played an essential role during the Gulf War. It hosted 
104 250 U.S. and allied combat aircraft that flew over 11,000 sorties against Iraq. 
This war demonstrates that the size of the country has nothing to do with its 
international role. The 320 square miles island, Bahrain, played a tremendous 
role which comes to the minds of military leaders   when they remember the 
liberation of Kuwait and the Gulf War. 
3.        BDF and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
On 10 March, 1981, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates, joined together to create the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to coordinate military, diplomatic, and other matters in the region. Under 
a 1984 agreement within the GCC, Bahrain and Oman were to receive $ 1.8 
billion in aid from richer members of the six-nation group, to build up their 
105 o        r r 
armed forces. It is unfortunate that some of the states did not keep this 
commitment. 
Saudi Arabia was the only country that kept its commitment to this 
program. After leading Bahrain to sign agreements with the United States and 
European suppliers, the others then backed out of the commitment because of 
their own financial problems in the wake of the Gulf War and with the drop in 
oil prices. As a result, Bahrain has been forced to go into debt to pay its bills and 
honor its obligations for past purchases, such as its fleet of 12 F-16 fighter 
aircraft. 
The failure of other members of the GCC to live up to past promises and 
to provide aid to the Bahrain military forces is making it difficult for future 
104 
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purchases to modernize. Unlike its neighbors, Bahrain does not have financing 
resources to buy new equipment. 
4.        BDF and the United States 
To help Bahrain continue building up its forces and as a result of the 
strong military relation, providing facilities for more than 40 years for the U.S. 
forces, and prepositioning of U.S. Naval equipment for use in crisis, the U.S. 
Government agreed to include Bahrain on the list of countries eligible to receive 
lethal equipment such as older-model F-16 fighters or older frigates no longer 
needed by U.S. forces. A change was approved by the Congress in November in 
the 1994 Defense Authorization Act. The act was signed by President Clinton on 
107 
30 November 1994. 
Bahrain will now be eligible to receive the equipment virtually free of 
charge in recognition of its role in supporting U.S. policy in the region. As it was 
stated by Major General, Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, Bahrain's Minister of 
Defense and Deputy of the Commander in Chief: 
When others have hesitated, we have always volunteered our 
support, even bad times when the United States was not even 
welcomed in this part of the world. The change to allow Bahrain to 
receive the excess equipment was essential to strengthen that 
country's armed forces and show U.S. support for an ally. It is 
better to have strong allies rather than weak ones. 
Bahrain is seeking a broad range of air force, naval, and army equipment. 
Bahrain's military leadership would like to add additional F-16s to its Air Force. 
As an island nation dependent on keeping sea lanes open, Bahrain is interested 
in strengthening its Navy by requesting, as excess, an FFG-7 frigate from the U.S. 
for antisubmarine warfare missions. The Bahraini Government is attempting to 
receive advanced U.S. technologies currently not permitted for sale in the Middle 
East, as military relations between the two countries grow closer. In addition 
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BDF is seeking used support equipment from U.S. stocks which are classified as 
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excess hardware and can be provided to U.S. allies virtually free of charge. 
Despite the approval by the Congress and the signature of the president 
allowing the BDF to receive lethal equipment, Bahrain Government officials 
indicated their disappointment by the slow pace in obtaining excess armaments 
from the U.S. As stated by Bahrain's Minister of Defense and Deputy of the 
Commander in Chief in an interview with Defense News, "We just want to join 
■    i ,,110 the queue, we are not even m the queue now. 
The major obstacle after Bahrain becomes eligible for excess equipment 
has been the reluctance of the U.S. military services to declare equipment as 
excess. They prefer instead to sell the equipment as used materiel, the proceeds 
of which can be applied to the services' own procurement priorities. But as the 
size of the U.S. Armed Forces shrink, large quantities of weapons are expected to 
be retired. 
5. Evolution of the FMS to BDF 
The Foreign Military Sale program was first used by BDF in 1976 for the 
procurement of the TOW missile system. Since then most of BDF procurement 
from the U.S. has been through FMS. 
Bahrain has turned almost entirely to the United States in its weapon 
procurement program. Generally, U.S. equipment is higher quality, cheaper, and 
enables the country to have a single logistics system rather than dealing with 
many nations. 
The total amount for BDF's procurement through FMS as of 30 September, 
1994, was about $1.1 billion with the total number of FMS cases at 144. This 
level of procurement represents 0.4 percent of the worldwide FMS sales and 
about 0.9 percent of the procurements by the Near East and South Asia. 
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C.        BDFS IN-HOUSE MECHANISM 
1. Organization 
BDF is structured with a Joint Headquarters (GHQ) for the all units. The 
Planning and Organization Directorate (POD) is considered to be Bahrain 
Defense Forces' brain and heart. This directorate collects input from internal and 
external agencies, sums them up, and analyzes them to come up with the 
effective and efficient five-year development plan for the whole forces. 
BDF has adopted matrix organization during the initial stages of project 
planning. This kind of organization allows BDF to form a Joint Committee (JC) 
from the units and the concerned directorates at the headquarters to conduct 
systems evaluation. Adopting this type of organization has reduced the cost of 
having a dedicated group of officers for the purpose of project planning and has 
achieved the goal of integrating the unit(s) in the preliminary stages of a project. 
The JC, which is usually headed by the POD Director, will first study the 
roles and missions approved by the Defense Council as guidelines. Then it will 
look into a sequence of options to fulfill the shortfalls. These are: the possibility 
of upgrading what is available, aid from the allies, pre-positioning, leasing or 
lease-to-buy, or procurement. 
2. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
BDF has adopted the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) in executing arming projects. This system has proven to be reliable and 
practical. Over time BDF has made improvements to this system and is still 
doing so in order make use of it as effectively as possible with the minimum cost. 
The PPBS is a proven system and will bring the best results in term of 
achieving the goals. PPBS also applies cost controls to each program. Its motives 
are to provide the most efficient and the least costly programs for the different 
units in terms of benefits and results. 
In the business sector results, measured by profit and loss, can be 
measured in terms of dollars. In the defense sector results are the benefits, 
accomplishments, and effects which must be related to costs. Therefore, the PPBS 
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The PPBS is just one part of good management. It is required to look at the 
future as well as at the past and present. Good planning requires a long range 
outlook. For most decision-making, a five-year span is generally considered 
necessary, although to complete many programs there must be a span that 
covers the delivery of the weapon system. In PPBS the examination is not always 
of the future. An examination of past operations and the present status is 
necessary to see what happened, if programs are on schedule, and if the course 
has to be changed to reach the objectives. 
The first phase of PPBS would include analyzing the data by filling in the 
missing parts, determining affordable needs, establishing priorities as to needs 
and what can be done with the available resources, choosing between 
alternatives, setting goals so that the plan can be carried out and completed in 
accordance with a schedule for best results. This will be done after the 
assessment of the threat; gathering as much information as possible about the 
present status of things, the objectives, and the needs. The end result is 
decisionmaking to decide what is to be done; what resources will be needed; 
how is it to be done; when is it to be done; what will be the benefits and effects 
against the threat, and what will it cost? 
The second phase is directing the plans. This means organizing the work 
and ensuring good communication throughout the organization at all levels so 
that the plans will be understood, coordination of the day-to-day operations to 
keep the work on schedule, and to make modification when necessary. This 
phase is considered more of an operational problem than a problem of planning. 
Generally, the operating organizations must determine by a study of alternative 
methods the best or most effective way of carrying the programs. In many cases 
it is easier to plan than to perform, and planning and performance must be 
linked together. 
The third phase is the control, measurement and evaluation of the results. 
Some methods of measuring results are necessary if management is to be able to 
determine how effective the results are, and on that basis to take necessary 
corrective action. This important process is done most commonly through a 
system of reports appropriately related to the plans, programs and budgets. The 
end result may be a modification of existing plans and on occasions the 
establishment   of   entirely   new   plans   and   objectives.   At   the   same   time 
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accomplishments are linked with the plans, and the cycle of planning, budgeting, 
accounting and reporting continues. 
The output of the PPBS is the Five Years Forces Development Plan 
(FYFDP). This plan is one of the basic requirements for the yearly defense 
budget. Beside having the cost requirements for the new weapon systems, the 
FYFDP will also include all other related costs for two years after the delivery of 
the system. Such time allows the concerned directorates to plan, integrate, and 
budget for the new system within their own yearly budget requirements once the 
responsibilities are transferred to them. The FYFDP is a joint effort between the 
GHQ and the units. The units are involved in constructing this plan right from 
the beginning especially at the first two phases, Planning and Programming. 
D.       THE PROCESS 
To execute successfully an FMS program, which should be derived from 
the FYFDP, BDF has adopted the following process which is closely related to the 




















Figure 1. FMS Process 
1. Pre-Planning 
A Specialized Committee (SC), which is a technical/operational 
committee usually headed by an officer from the end user unit, will study and 









will work closely with the manufacturers to get all the data required to assess 
and select the system. The committee will also work closely with the Office of 
Military Cooperation (OMC) at the American Embassy to acquire all releasability 
information. The SC final report should identify but is not limited to: the new 
system organization chart and how it will be integrated with the existing 
organization; personnel requirements and all of their generated cost; the 
facilities and their upkeep yearly cost; maintenance and logistics running cost, 
and the training/operation ammunition requirements. 
The committee responsibility will extend until one year after the in- 
country delivery of the system. The committee has to be realistic in selecting the 
weapon system and will take into consideration several primary factors, some of 
which are the capabilities of the end users to operate and maintain the new 
systems and the additional requirements to fully utilize it. The committee will 
consider as much as possible standardization with the existing systems in order 
to lessen the stress on both the users and the budget. 
This committee will be supervised by the Director of POD who will be 
briefed on a daily basis by an officer who is a member in the SC and is referred to 
as the Point of Contact (PoC) for the project. The POD will also be briefed on a 
biweekly basis by the SC. 
2. Letter of Request (LOR) 
Once the system is selected, a letter of request for an LOA will be 
prepared by the SC and will be sent to the OMC. The basis for the preparation of 
this letter is the LOR Checklist as per USASAC's guidebook. The request should 
be as detailed as possible to reduce the amount of message traffic between 
Bahrain and the United Sates. 
3. Site Survey 
The site survey teams are associated with major weapon systems and will 
usually be accompanied by the contractor representatives. The purpose of such a 
team is to help the SC in assessing the requirements for introducing a specific 
weapon system into the country. The other benefit of the survey is to allow for 
the most accurate assessment of delivery schedules and pricing data. 
4. Pre-LOA Meeting 
From BDF's experience with the FMS, the pre-LOA meeting is a helpful 
action. This has become a rule of thumb at the POD for major projects. These 
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kinds of meetings help the U.S. Project Manager to write out a case that will 
require few changes. This meeting is usually preceded by a list of questionnaires 
on what the SC needs to cover during the meeting. In the pre-LOA meeting the 
results of the site survey are presented in terms of requirements and estimated 
cost. 
5. Offer Development 
Once the LOA is written by the applicable Implementing Agency (IA) an 
Advance Copy (AC) which is not countersigned will be forwarded to the POD 
before it is sent to DSAA for countersignature. After receiving the AC, the SC 
will study it and forward the required memos to their superiors for approval. 
6. Congressional Review 
One of the roles of the Congress is to review the proposed arms transfers 
under FMS, and approve or disapprove the releasability of the weapon system. 
Therefore, the POD stays in close contact with DSAA and provides the status of 
the releasability request and if needed, will arrange the required coordination 
with the assistance from the manufacturer to achieve the releasability. 
7. Offer and Acceptance 
Once the original cases are received, in a matter of days the case is signed 
(if the advance copies were reviewed) and forwarded to the OMC with a cover 
letter which will specify the changes required (if any) and the directions for the 
payments of the initial deposit. 
8. Initial Payment 
The payment can be done by using one of three available methods: from 
the holding account, from the interest bearing account, and from the budget. The 
transfer of money using the first and second methods is faster because those 
accounts are held in the U.S. and require BDF authorization for money transfer. 
The third method usually takes time because it involves many approval stages. 
BDF maintains a direct telephone link with Defense Finance Accounting 
and Service (DFAS) which helps in following up the payments and is used to 
clarify aggregated payments. Once DFAS confirms receiving the initial deposit, 
the next step is to follow the implementation. 
BDF maintains three major holding accounts with DFAS . Those are the 
Army (IBB), the Air Force (1DD), and the Navy (1PP). Some of the sources of 









and compensations for the approved Reports of Discrepancies. None of these 
accounts generates interest, so the BDF policy is to keep in them the minimum 
amounts required to remain open. 
There is a fourth account that is held at Federal Reserve Bank-New York 
(FRB) which generates interest and contains most of the money. To expedite the 
case implementation, and to get around the multiple stage payment procedure 
from the budget, POD can send a request to deduct the initial payments from 
this account, which then can be reimbursed once the payments are approved 
from the budget. 
9. Program Implementation 
Most of the major projects are implemented with no delay, but other 
isolated cases may take as long as a year. A master delivery schedule will be 
prepared and updated by SC based on the implementation dates. 
10. In-Country Requirements 
The SC will work on the in-country requirements to support the project 
and will work with all the concerned directors at the GHQ for the requirements. 
Those requirements are: recruitment, facilities, ground support equipment, 
selecting and preparing both the officers and enlisted, updating the master 
schedule for the project, updating the running cost reference, arranging with the 
different agencies to support the delivery of the systems once delivered, and 
working on the security clearances for the different teams that are related to the 
project. 
The different teams that usually accompany the delivery of major weapon 
systems are: the Quality Assurance team (QAT), which is responsible about the 
in-country assembly of the weapon system; the Mobile Training Team (MTT), 
which will conduct the operational training on the weapon delivered weapon 
system; the Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), which are military 
personnel that will provide technical assistance and training to the recipient 
military personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of specific 
equipment, technology, weapon, supporting systems, or other special skills 
related to military functions; and the Civilian Engineering Team (CET), whose 
function is similar to the TAFT except that they are civilians from the 
manufacturer. 
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The SC will brief the Defense Council on the process on a monthly basis. 
In such meetings all the concerned directors will attend so that problems can be 
solved on-the-spot and with no delay. 
11.      Follow-On Support 
POD is in charge of the project for two years starting with the successful 
operation of the system and the acceptance of the concerned unit. Within those 
two years the concerned directors will work closely with POD to work out 
additional budget requirements to support the projects. The POD's responsibility 
will then be transferred to the Training Directorate (TRG) who will be 
responsible for the follow-on training and to the Maintenance & Logistics 
Directorate (DML) to look after the maintenance support and follow-on spares 
requirements. Ammunition support (both training & life) will remain the 
responsibility of POD. The roles of the directorates in the procurement programs 
can be shown as follows: 
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D.      FOREIGN MILITARY SALES VS DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES 
1. Foreign Military Sales 
BDF has used both FMS and DCS with the U.S. Government and 
manufacturers around the world. BDF's experience with the FMS goes back to 
1976, and the BDF has always preferred FMS over DCS. There are many reasons 
for this, chief among them is the government-to-government dealings which 
become a key element that will ease the approval process within the BDF. The 
advantages of the FMS can be summarized as follows: 
• Complete project that takes advantage of the American military 
experience. 
• Reduces the cost because of: 
• Consolidating procurements. 
• Availability of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). 
• Allows for competition between different sources. 
• Standardization with the U.S. forces. 
• The customer pays the actual cost plus three percent as administration 
fee. 
• Utilizing the money paid to its full extent, by allowing excess money 
from one case be transferred to others. 
• Quality assurance. 
• Availability of equipment from the U.S. stock in crisis situation. 
• Participation of the U.S. DoD in the project planning, defining the 
general concept, optimization, and determining the effect on the 
doctrine of the project. 
• Assure the use of the U.S. military schools. 






2. Direct Commercial Sales 
The DCS process requires a dedicated staff to handle its various aspects 
which the BDF lacks at this stage. It is usually the responsibility of an officer in 
the POD in charge of the project to deal with and follow the contractual issues. 
The DCS process, which is time consuming, starts with a study of all 
technical issues with the contractor representatives. Then, the terms and 
conditions are finalized with the lawyers. Finally, price negotiation with the 
Paymaster, who can be counted on to squeeze the contractor for the maximum 
discount. In spite of this, DCS has advantages over the FMS. The advantages of 
DCS can be summarized as follows: 
Specific cost and delivery schedule with the ability of penalizing the 
contractor in the case of a breach. 
Negotiation on the cost and the contract terms and conditions. 
Quick response because of the direct contact. 
The only source for non-military standard. 
Continuity in dealing with the same people. 
All equipment is new. 
Constant and fixed payments which makes it easier for the budgeting. 
Possibility of benefiting from the OFFSET programs for technology 
transfer. 
No administration fee. 
Continues improvement for the buyer abilities in negotiation. 
3. Manufacturer's Role 
Even though BDF prefers executing acquisition programs through FMS, 
the BDF still rely on the contractors for other important aspects that serves the 
PPBS's different phases. 
POD uses the contractors as a source of information regarding the weapon 













coordinator with Congress to obtain releasability (General Dynamics played a 
major role to grant the F-16 releasability for Bahrain). The contractor can provide 
information regarding the operating cost of the system and can assist in 
administering the project by attending the Program Management Review (PMR) 
for FMS projects. Contractors can also provide an excellent feedback about the 
process of the FMS project and the project's status. POD always avoids crossing 
the line where the contractor is in competition with the U.S. Government, which 
is against the law. 
After reviewing both the U.S. FMS process in Chapter III, and BDF's 
mechanism to deal with the FMS in this chapter, the next chapter shall address 
the impact of the FMS on the policies on BDF. 
E.       SUMMARY 
Since BDF was formed in 1968, the Government of Bahrain has 
continuously supported the development of the BDF. Being a member of the 
GCC, Bahrain was to receive resources to build its defense force from richer 
members of the six nations group. Due to financial problems of some of those 
countries, the commitment to Bahrain was not kept. This led the government to 
go into debt to pay its bills and to cover its obligations of past commitments. 
In recognition of its role and the continuous support of the U.S. policy in 
the region, President Clinton signed on 30 November 1994, an act that authorizes 
Bahrain to receive excess lethal military equipment. 
FMS was first used by BDF in 1976. Since then, most of its procurement 
from the U.S. is done through this channel. BDF procurement represent 0.4 
percent of the worldwide FMS sales. 
BDF has adopted PPBS in executing its military procurement projects. The 
output of the PPBS is the BDF's FYFDP. This plan is a joint effort between the 
BDF Joint Headquarter and its units and is the basis for BDF's budget. 
The process of FMS in BDF is similar to that implemented by the United 
States. To achieve continuity, the SC is responsible for the project starting from 
the pre-planning phase until one year after the in-country delivery and the 
acceptance by the end user. 
BDF has always preferred FMS over DCS for many reasons, chief among 






manufacturers as a good source of information during the evaluation phase and 
also as an important player in the coordination of the sale of the weapon system 
to the BDF. 
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V. IMPACT OF U.S. FMS POLICIES ON BDF 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
No country is completely self-sufficient for all of its defense needs. Even 
the United States must look abroad for advanced communications systems and 
training aircraft. It also imports various raw materials needed for weapons 
development. But for Third World countries, the issue of how to achieve and 
maintain a modern force structure, both in terms of order of battle and 
organization, is increasingly an acute problem. 
Before any country enters into a program of force modernization, it is vital 
that the perceived threat be properly defined and that an assessment of the 
country's ability to meet that threat be made. For some countries, the answer to 
their defense needs is to purchase equipment from foreign sources. Others would 
be wiser to establish a defense industrial base. For a country such as Bahrain, 
where natural resources are lacking, an industrial infrastructure is lacking, and 
where manpower, most of all, is lacking, it is not practical to consider building a 
domestic defense industry. Bahrain must continue to depend on suppliers for its 
defense equipment. 
While such an arrangement may run like clockwork during peacetime, it 
is important to consider the consequences of depending on another country for 
spare parts and maintenance in a time of a conflict. One possible problem is that 
the supplying country may no longer be an ally as a result of political changes. 
An example of this is the problem Iran faces in maintaining its U.S.-built 
equipment. There is also the problem of ensuring deliveries from a friendly 
country for the duration of a protracted conflict. A good example is the problem 
Argentina faced during the South Atlantic War, since its equipment was largely 
U.S., French, and even British. Speed of delivery in time of conflict is another 
important consideration. An example of this is the U.S. resupply of Israel in the 
113 
Gergory R. Copley, "Keeping Up With the Neighbors," Defense & Foreign Affairs,  14, no.  1 








1973 war that showed that extraordinary measures might be necessary in a fast- 
paced protracted war. 
Despite these possible problems, Bahrain's leadership hopes that these 
problems can be overcome by maintaining close ties with the allies. For armed 
forces such as Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), with limited budget, moderate size, 
and fully dependent on importing all of its military needs, small mistakes can be 
expensive, petty delays can be serious, and unstable flow of support can be 
harmful. 
BDF depends on FMS for modernization, even though the FMS has 
adopted, and continues to adopt policies that affect negatively its procurement 
planning, the fielding of the defense articles to BDF units, and the operational 
readiness of BDF weapon systems. It is important for BDF to adopt accurate 
budget planning so as to use its limited resources effectively and efficiently, and 
also to maintain a reasonable flow of logistical support ensuring timely weapon 
system operation and readiness. 
This chapter builds upon the information presented in chapter II and III to 
answer a key questions related to the U.S. security assistance FMS policies: 
• What are the problems that play key roles in the efficiency of BDF 
procurement planning? 
• What are the problem that affect the fielding of the defense articles to 
BDF units? 
Also this chapter will address two areas concerning the Cooperative 
Logistic Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) that affected the recipient 
support and weapon system readiness. Those are: 
• The reliability of the CLSSA which is DoD's most effective means to 
replenish the in-country stock of spare parts and repair parts and the 
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As a result of the U.S. policy of not considering the ammunition and its 
components in the CLSSA program, the problems that are facing 
BDF in regard to ammunition procurement. 
B.        IMPACT ON BDFs PROCUREMENT PLANNING 
1.        Contract 
Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the U.S. Government offers 
to sell to purchasers defense articles and services. The Letter of Acceptance 
(LOA) is the official agreement between the United States and the purchaser 
regarding terms and conditions pertaining to furnishing certain goods and 
services. Essential to any contract is an agreement that may be defined as a so- 
called "meeting of the minds" prior to the transaction. 
When procuring for the purchaser, the DoD employs the same contract 
clauses, the same contract administration, and the same inspection procedures as 
would be used in processing for itself, except as otherwise requested by the 
purchaser and as agreed to by the DoD. In general, the low skill level of the 
purchaser's contracting staff is one of the major reasons why the purchaser 
favors FMS. 
Most FMS customers do not have skilled contract teams. Further, it is not 
easy for them to understand the U.S. Government's complex contract laws. 
Therefore, even though the purchaser has specified exact requirements, the 
United States often fails to reflect them in the contract. The major problems of the 
purchaser are as follows: 
• Misunderstanding of the U.S. Government contract laws and 
regulations. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Defense 
Acquisition Regulations (DAR), Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR), General Conditions of DD Form 1513 are the basic documents 
of FMS contracting. However, it is difficult for the purchaser to 
follow them without a professional contract team because of their 
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complexity. Further, the changes of regulations and their impact on the 
purchaser are hard to interpret. The general terms and condition on 
DD Form 1513 are frequently illegible. As a result, the 
misunderstanding of the contract laws leads to an unfair and unilateral 
120 ö 
contract. 
Poor communication in the contract. There should be a "meeting of 
minds" in the contract. However, there are several obstacles to the 
communication: few officers with the contractual and language skills, 
the miscomprehension of the contract laws, ill-preparation of 
negotiation, and the uncertain requirements. 
Poor negotiation. Neither government can direct the transaction. Sales 
•should be negotiated. Unfortunately, there are no negotiation clauses 
in the Manual of Security Assistance Management or other security 
assistance references. Clearly, negotiation is the most important area 
which the purchaser must develop. The reasons for poor negotiations 
are similar to the reasons for poor communication. 
Inflexibility of contract type. The only type of agreement available 
under FMS is cost reimbursement. This type of contract is often used 
in U.S. Government procurements. Its typical applications are for 
research and development. Cost reimbursement contracts provide for 
payment of allowable cost incurred in the performance of the contract, 
to the extent prescribed in the contract. It establishes an estimate of 
costs for the purposes of obligation of funds, and a ceiling that the 
contractor may not exceed without prior approval by the contracting 
office. FAR, Part thirty-one contains statement-of-cost principles that 
are used as the basis for determining cost under cost reimbursement 
contracts. This type of contract is used only when it is likely to be less 
costly than other methods, or it is impractical to secure suppliers or 
services of the kind or quality required without the use of such a 
120 
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contract.  However, the FMS customer does not have any other 
alternatives except this type of agreement. 
• No waiver clauses to BDF. Only where it is proved clearly that a 
particular sale significantly advances U.S. interests in standardization, 
the specific cost recoupment charges may be reduced or waived. 
Under the current law, waiver is applied to NATO, NATO member 
countries, Australia, Japan or New Zealand. The BDF has been in a 
close relation with the U.S. and is equipped mostly with the U.S. 
standardized weapon system, but is not included in the waiver clauses. 
2.        Pricing 
Current pricing policy is a legacy from the past. Since the Second World 
War, the U.S. has been the major supplier of weapon systems to the Free World, 
and frequently the only source of support for a specific weapon systems. The 
AECA requires the U.S. DoD to recover the full cost of all foreign military 
sales. 
In U.S. Government procurements, high dollar contracts for major 
weapon systems frequently fall into the category of sole source negotiations. 
Such negotiations, however, usually start as intensively competitive negotiations. 
Competition is based on cost, design and management areas. Even in sole source 
negotiations the U.S. Government must buy at reasonable prices. Prices will be 
negotiated. Competition is the prerequisite of the U.S. Government procurement. 
124 
When it is not possible, then a cost analysis must be performed. 
From the perspective of the U.S. customers, prices are also a primary 
source of decisionmaking in the defense procurement. The good performance at 
a reasonable price makes a certain system attractive to a customer. In reality, it is 
difficult for the foreign country to evaluate prices of weapon systems provided 
by FMS. The only source of a sales price from the U.S. Government is the 
Planning and Review (P&R) or the Price and Availability (P&A) which includes 
122 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 
123 3rd Edition (Dayton: Wright-Patterson AFB., 1982), 3-18. 
U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Sales Manual, DoD 5105.38M (Washington, 
124D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 1981), III. 
David L.   Mcllhaney,  Some  Problems  in DoD  Policy  for  Pricing  of FMS,  Leadership  and 
Management Development (Alabama: Maxwell AFB, 1982), 1-3. 
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charges as a single price. Further, information on the P&A of the U.S. defense 
equipment or services is provided with the LOA. Under DoD policy, the 
customer has only sixty days to accept the LOA. Accordingly, the customer 
has only limited pricing information and a short period of time for review. In 
detail, the other restrictions on the customer's price evaluation are as follows: 
• The U.S. Government does not compete with U.S. industry for military 
sales. Moreover, as a matter of policy, the U.S. Government normally 
does not knowingly provide foreign customers comparison price 
information. 
• The direct comparison of LOA and commercial contract prices is 
difficult since they employ quite dissimilar pricing structures. 
127 
• DoD policy allows the purchaser only sixty days to review the LOA. 
Usually, this is not enough time to evaluate P&A in the developing 
countries. 
128 
• P&A or P&R is only an estimate of total cost. According to the 
General Conditions of DD Form 1513, the purchaser shall make 
payment(s) to the U.S. Government of the total cost to the U.S. 
Government of the item even if the final total cost exceeds ten percent 
of the amounts estimated on LOA. Thus, the large variance between 
the estimation and the final cost may make a price evaluation 
worthless. 
• Without consideration of its requirements for the weapon systems in 
advance, and if the purchaser relies only on the P&A or P&R, price 
evaluation may not be beneficial. In addition to price, delivery time, 
quality and performance are other major areas to be considered. Even 
though the purchaser procures weapon systems at a low price, the 
125 .  „   ■     . 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
,,,,    Assistance, 3rd Edition, 9-6. 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Assistance, 14th Edition, 261. 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
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The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Assistance, 14th Edition, 148. 
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purchaser's specific requirements, performance, and quality cannot be 
insured. 
• The U.S. Government has pursued a program to recover its full cost of 
transaction. It has neglected to calculate the savings to the U.S. 
through the FMS programs. Savings attributed to FMS are classified 
into five major categories: Research and Development (R&D) 
recoupment, learning curve effects and economies of scale, overhead 
cost, production line gap and others. The U.S. Government has also 
failed to consider the additional costs caused by the U.S. Government 
in administering the FMS program. Some examples include late 
delivery, delay of reporting and processing, double billing or wrong 
prices. 
3.        Financing 
FMS is a cost reimbursement agreement which requires advance payment. 
No matter what the estimated costs, payment schedule, or terms of sale specified 
in the LOA, the General Conditions of DD Form 1513 require that the FMS 
purchaser shall pay in U.S. dollars for the full value of transaction and that there 
130 
shall be no cost to the U.S. Government. Financing is a primary concern of both 
the customer and U.S. because it affects the funds flow of the FMS transaction. 
There are some considerations that have a significant impact on the purchaser: 
• Case closure. The reason closure is discussed here is that it is a 
significantly sensitive area for the customer. Delay of case closure 
happens for the two reasons: no agreement on final contract price 
between the Foreign Government and the U.S., or no closure of the 
contract between the U.S. and its contractor. Sometimes these delays 
are up to five years and preclude settlement of the FMS case. Such 
delays should be unacceptable to both the U.S. and the FMS customer. 
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation Supplement (ASPS) No. 
2, Paragraph S2-305(a) provides the following standard times allowed 
for closing physically completed contracts: fixed price unilateral 
purchase orders, three months; firm fixed price, six months; and all 
other contracts twenty calendar months after the month in which it is 
129 
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The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Assistance, 3rd Edition, 8-16. 
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physically completed.     However, these standard times are usually 
not observed; 
• High Report of Discrepancy (ROD) claims limitation. It is the policy of 
the U.S. to efficiently process reported claims and to be responsible for 
their collection, with the U.S. reimbursing the recipient country. The 
current minimum monetary value for reporting discrepancies is $25 
for cases prior to 1 August 1977 and $100 for cases on or after 1 August 
1977. The reason for raising the limit was that the number of 
discrepancy reports processed by the DFAS in a recent year 
approached 30,000 and with an estimated $115 cost of processing for 
each ROD. The BDF suffered losses of thousands of dollars for RODs 
below $100. 
• Cost reimbursement with the advance payment. The purchaser shall 
include in payment the costs estimated for the next three months. 
Collectively, the increase in price, the changes in the quarterly payments, 
the delays in the delivery of the defense articles, and the case closure are all 
affecting BDF's budget planning, rationing, and its force development. 
When BDF budgets to pay a certain amount for a weapon system, based 
on the prices reflected in the FMS case, BDF may end up paying twice as much 
the budgeted price. Also, if BDF budgeted to pay another amount for the 
different FMS cases during the year, based on the quarterly requirements, the 
BDF might have to postpone other projects to pay the required amounts or may 
end up ultimately losing the entire amount. 
In the first situation, where other projects must be postponed, the required 
payments for the FMS cases are higher than those indicated in the quarterly 
requirements schedule. In the other situation, where the money may ultimately 
be lost, the actual quarterly payments requirements by the DoD for a project are 
less than the scheduled amount or in some cases where payments are not even 
required. This does not mean saving the money, but in fact losing it. At the end 
of the year all the surplus will go back to the Bahrain's Government. This latter 
132 
133 Ibid. 8-17. 
134 Ibid. 22-1. 
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 
14th Edition, 288. 
66 
 
 .       
  
   
 u s    
  u s   
    
        
     
      




Situation has more impact on the BDF's following year budget, because the 
government looks at the surplus as money not required and therefore, better 
utilized somewhere else. 
Additionally, the delay in the delivery of the weapon system is causing 
the directorates and the units to lose confidence in the BDF's Five Years Force 
Development Plan (FYFDP). Of course, it is only a plan and changes are 
expected, but a plan is also an administrative process that has become 
increasingly prominent as a sign of good management. An organization that 
does not plan is thought to be reactive, shortsighted, and rudderless. Planning 
has become a ceremony that an organization must conduct periodically if it 
wants to maintain its legitimacy. A plan is a badge of honor that organizations 
wear conspicuously and with pride. 
4. Implementation 
The signature by the customer on the LOA marks only the end of an initial 
process. The full process may extend to four years for major weapon systems. 
The implementation time, which is the trigger for starting the project, is usually 
within three months of the FMS case initial payment being received by Defense 
136 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). In some cases, the implementation 
time has been shorter than usual especially with FMS cases related to major 
weapon systems. A recent example of the short implementation, the BDF's Peace 
Arrow project, concerning Cobra attack helicopters, includes six FMS cases. 
Although those cases were the responsibility of different Commands and 
Agencies, they were all implemented within the three months period. However, 
this has not been the case with another FMS cases, where the implementation 
time, in most situations, is undefined. 
The implementation process in some cases may extend to a year or even 
longer, which will in turn affect the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) by delaying other scheduled programs. Beside being lengthy, the 
implementation time for FMS cases can vary from one FMS case to another even 
though it is a very similar case. This variation has made it even more difficult to 
135 
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use the already undefined implementation time as a reference for future 
planning. It has also led to uncertainty, delays, and is a source for continuing 
variation of the plan as will be seen in the following examples. 
On January 1987, BDF requested grenade launchers through FMS. Three 
FMS cases, the launchers case with a delivery of thirty months, the ammunition 
case with a delivery from stock, and the training case, were signed by BDF after 
six months of the request. The ammunition case was implemented within five 
months and the delivery took place on January 1988. On June 1988, BDF was 
advised by the OMC that a new request for the launchers and the training had to 
be initiated because the responsibility of this system had been transferred from 
the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Army. The new cases were received on June 1989 with a 
new estimated delivery of forty months. The cases were implemented on 
February 1990, which means that the delivery will be on June 1993 instead of July 
1989. 
In another case, the BDF had requested training ammunition for M60A3 
tanks currently operated by BDF. The case was implemented within seven 
months from the signature date and the initial deposit. This seven months period 
is usually the most current reference to plan future requirements. In the 
following year, the BDF had requested the same quantity and type of 
ammunition using the previous case data as a good planning reference. It is 
unfortunate that the new case reflects a delay of two years in the delivery. The 
case was implemented fifteen months after the case was signed. 
C.        IMPACT ON BDF's SUPPLY SUPPORT AND WEAPON SYSTEM 
READINESS 
1. Supply Support 
Customer countries overwhelmingly prefer to acquire defense systems' 
follow-on logistic support through additional FMS cases rather than direct 
commercial support. Currently, there are fifty Cooperative Logistic Supply 
Support Arrangement (CLSSA) participants out of the seventy-six countries and 
two international organizations that purchase follow-on logistic support from the 
137 
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U.S. Ninety-seven percent of these follow-on requisitions are submitted via the 
special logistic program CLSSA. The CLSSA program is designed to enhance 
timely follow-on spare and repair support by providing a mechanism for the 
FMS customers to participate in the DoD supply system. To participate in 
CLSSA, the FMS customer must project anticipated future requirements and 
provide an initial deposit equal to five-seventeenths of the material value of their 
requirements. The DoD then orders the material so that when the FMS customer 
actually needs the material, the material is either already on-hand ready for 
shipment or on-order with most of the procurement lead time having already 
transpired. 
Two types of FMS cases form the basis of the CLSSA program: the Foreign 
Military Sales Order I (FMSO I) and the Foreign Military Sales Order II (FMSO 
II). Basically, the FMSO I orders material into the DoD inventory in anticipation 
of subsequent FMS demands, and the FMSO II pulls the material from the DoD 
inventory and provides funds for the procurement of a replacement item. The 
DoD managed FMSO I cases are collectively valued at $1,086,275,576 as of 7 
March 1994, and the FMSO II cases had an annual requisitions value of 
$715,289,936. Cumulatively, the CLSSA program has an impact on the DoD 
supply system of $1.8 billion. 
The FMSO I does not operate in an efficient manner for investment items. 
Thirty-six percent of all investment items on the FMSO I case have had no 
demands in the past four years and fourteen percent of the items added to the 
FMSO I in the past four years also have had no demands. Over the past ten 
years, only about forty-five percent of the investment item requisitions submitted 
140 
received the benefits of preferential supply treatment offered by CLSSA. The 
estimated amount of funds obligated to the thirty-six percent of items that has 
not been demanded is around $319 million. This amount has been growing over 
the last few years at a seven to ten percent rate.     This means that the foreign 
138 
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139PCN: U-W001 (QAID 253R) (Dayton: Wright-Patterson AFB., October, 1993), 1. 
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customers' investment purchased items that are no longer required or are very 
low demand items. The funds used for those purchases could have been used 
more effectively, if a method existed, to accurately predict the items actually 
demanded. Additionally, another concern is over the price of the items that is 
constantly increasing due to inflation and storage charges. 
The impact on the price was greatly increased by the DoD implementation 
of Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 904 in October 1992. DMRD 
904 directed the stock funding of reparables. Stock funding had a direct impact 
on CLSSA investment items because almost all investment items are reparables. 
Before reparables could be converted to the stock fund concept, the reparable 
inventory had to be capitalized. This capitalization action increased the price of 
CLSSA investment items in inventory between five and thirty seven percent. 
The percentage of increase was based on the data of the last procurement 
(acquisition cost). If the item had not been bought for years, as in the case of 
some F-5 aircraft components, the price increase is close to thirty-seven 
percent. 
Prior to the implementation of DMRD 904 the stock list price of an item 
was only updated (increased or decreased) when a reprocurement action was 
taken. This meant that once the CLSSA customer added an item to the FMSO I 
case, it could remain on the case indefinitely without experiencing a price 
increase, even if there was no usage for the item. However, under DMRD 904, 
the price of the item will be adjusted (increased or decreased, but mostly 
increased) each year. Therefore, if the customer maintains an inactive item on the 
FMSO I case, and the price of the item increases each year, the customer will be 
assessed a higher price to keep the item on the FMSO I case (the five- 
seventeenths amount required to be on deposit will increase). In addition, the 
customer will be assessed a higher price (the current stock list price) when the 
145 
customer removes the item from the case.    Thus implementation of DMRD 904 
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imposed a twofold penalty on the CLSSA customers who do not actively manage 
the items on their FMSOI case. 
This poor performance is a clear indicator that the DoD needs to modify 
the CLSSA program to ensure that it operates efficiently and provides quality, 
timely spares support in response to the foreign customers' investment. If the 
DoD cannot provide timely logistic support for its weapon systems, the use of 
FMS and its associated reliance on the personal and material resources of 
friendly governments for augmented support in a conflict will diminish. Loss of 
FMS sales would also mean a loss in political, military, and economic benefits for 
the U.S. as a whole. To continue to share these support costs with the allies and 
to maintain the U.S. defense industrial base, the DoD must provide efficient, 
quality customer logistic support. 
In order to receive the full benefits of the CLSSA program, the customer 
must ensure that the FMSO I case contains actively used items. Preferential 
supply treatment offered by CLSSA is referred to as "programmed" support. 
Through the proper management of the FMSO I case, the customer can ensure 
that all his requirements receive programmed support. The benefit of a 
programmed requisition versus a nonprogrammed requisition is in the amount 
of stock on the shelf that can be shipped to fill the requisition. Programmed 
requisitions are eligible to be filled from stock down to the zero level. 
Nonprogrammed requisitions are eligible to be filled from stock only if the on- 
hand and assets are above the item manager's control level. Thus, if the item 
manager's asset position was at the control level a programmed requisition 
would be immediately filled to the zero level. In this same situation, a 
nonprogrammed requisition would be filled one lead time away, resulting in 
support delay, and most likely an increased unit price. 
Since the FMSO I is an on-going case, the value can vary based on changes 
in the participant's requirements. The DoD renegotiates the FMSO I case every 
six months to financially update the FMSO I case value. The DoD uses the 
participant's two year demand history and the existing stocklevel requirements 
to produce a CLSSA Stocklevel Renegotiation List. This list is intended to be used 
146 
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by the participants to evaluate their current investment items' Stock Level 
Quantity (SLQ) and make adjustments based on current and projected 
operational requirements. However, for many CLSSA participants, 
renegotiations is a difficult task. Many participants do not have established 
procedures, experience, or tools necessary to make good predictions. This results 
in items and quantities on the CLSSA that did not receive the level of customer 
country management necessary to ensure that the country's CLSSA reflects its 
actual needs. 
2.        Weapon System Readiness 
The sale of a weapon system and its associated spare parts and accessories 
to an allied foreign country can constitute "an investment in the national security 
and well-being of the United States." Foreign Military Sales provide the U.S. 
allies with the means of defending their own nations, making them stronger and 
better able to share in the defense of the free world. The United States can then 
reserve  its  armed forces for more  significant threats  to  its  own national 
149 
security. 
The key words for logistics planners clearly have become readiness and 
sustainability. The first implies having enough weapons and supplies at the 
beginning of a war; the latter refers to the ability to procure, maintain, and 
deliver additional at once as needed during the course of a conflict. 
If a foreign customer became dissatisfied with the U.S. procedures for 
processing his spare requirements, the customer can still pursue his requirements 
directly through the manufacturers. But this is not the case with ammunition 
requirements. The ammunition must be procured through the DoD. 
The rapid advancement during the last two decades in weapon 
technology and the requirement to improve its operational readiness, has led to 
increasing complex and sophisticated types of ammunitions. This sophistication 
makes the ammunitions maintenance requirement more complex. To improve 
the operational readiness of a weapon system and to sustain a conflict, the 
ammunition availability has to be increased especially because readiness implies 
147 
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not only the ability to attempt to accomplish a mission but also to accomplish it 
well. 
Optimizing the storage of ammunition is critical and complicated. It is 
critical because in an war, a sufficient quantity of ammunition may make the 
difference between victory and defeat. It is complicated, because storage involves 
weighing and balancing the factors of cost, space, ammunition type, shelf life, 
and the identity and size of potential enemies. 
The BDF has experienced a lot of delays in the procurement of its live and 
training ammunition requirements. The delay is mainly due to the long lead time 
for delivery and the complexity of the parts that make-up a type of ammunition. 
As an example of the complexity, twenty-eight parts are needed to build one 500 
bound bomb (MK-82). Adding to the complexity, some of the parts have limited 
shelf-life and some have different units of issue. If this bomb were to be prepared 
as a laser guided bomb, then the number of units required will increase to thirty- 
two. It is becoming even more difficult to get the right mix of ammunition to 
achieve combat lethality with declining budget. 
Although required for weapon system support, ammunitions and 
ammunition components are ineligible for the CLSSA program. It seems that the 
DoD, up until this time, has only considered timely responsive support to 
equipment other than ammunitions. 
Procurement of ammunition is very expensive. Usually it is one of the 
primary drains on any force's budget. Therefore, ammunition needs to be well 
controlled and should be stored in a controlled environment to insure an 
extended life. Storing ammunition should be optimized, so that during a crisis, 
the required types of ammunition are available at the right place and the right 
time. 
It is clear that defense decisionmakers face a difficult planning and 
management task: assuring that their peacetime decisions result in maximum 
effectiveness of their combat units in a wartime environment. It is apparent that 
the defense decisions made today have great impacts on a nation's security in the 
future. 
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In spite of all areas of concern, the FMS is still very efficient. The fact that 
there is willingness on the part of foreign governments to continually buy under 
FMS guidelines proves this. However, room for improvement does exist, and 
some effort is needed to consider the buyer's interest. For the United States to be 
able to rely on its friends and allies, it is important to help them maintain high 
weapon system readiness rates by being more responsive to their requests. 
D.        SUMMARY 
For some countries, the answer to their defense needs is to purchase 
equipment from foreign sources. For others, it would be wiser to establish a 
defense industrial base. There are consequences in depending on another 
country for spare parts and maintenance in a time of a conflict. The leadership of 
Bahrain, one of the first group of countries, hopes that problems of depending on 
others can be overcome by maintaining close ties with the allies. 
The U.S. FMS is governed by the policies of U.S. security assistance, which 
have been viewed differently in each U.S. administration, as explained in 
Chapter II. In some cases, it is unfortunate that these policies have had negative 
impacts on the FMS recipients. The FMS, the largest element of the overall 
security assistance program is overwhelmingly used by the U.S. customers, and 
as a result receives the most criticism. Each customer has his own priorities and 
his own ways of doing business. Additionally, the customer pays the United 
States 3 percent of the overall case value to the United States to manage and 
administer the case. Whatever the outcome, the customer must accept it. It is not 
unreasonable to say that, being paid to manage the case, the U.S. should take 
some responsibility for the outcome of the case. 
The U.S. policies in regard to the FMS have obvious effects on the 
recipient planning and his weapon system readiness. The FMS contract clauses, 
the implementation, the pricing, and financing policies, all have an impact on the 
recipient budget planning, rationing, and force development. 
In addition, the methods that have been established for using CLSSA, 
which is considered by the DoD as the most effective means to support the 
customers needs, are not reliable enough and require improvement, so that the 
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customer may benefit more from his investment in the CLSSA. Although 
required for weapon system support, ammunition and its parts are ineligible for 
the CLSSA program. On top of that, the normal support for the customer's 
ammunition requirements is delayed due to the long lead times and the 
complexity of the parts that make-up modern ammunition. To better support its 
friends, the United States must improve those policies and should reconsider its 
policies regarding the ammunition, being ineligible for the CLSSA support. The 
customer can still use a defense article, in the event of war, even though it is not 
fully mission capable (FMC), but can do nothing when the mission requires 
ammunition or equipment that is not in FMC condition. 
75 
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly summarize the thesis and offer 
recommendations for future areas of research. 
The objective of this thesis is to discuss the impact of the U.S. arms 
transfers policies on the recipient force. 
The thesis began by addressing the U.S. security assistance. Chapter II 
described the evolution of the U.S. security assistance policies, its programs, the 
U.S. policy in the Arabian Gulf, and the position of the United States in the arms 
market. 
Chapter III of the thesis has described U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS). 
The FMS was traced from the pre-planning phase to the case closure phase. Then 
the chapter followed with an explanation of the FMS initial and follow-on 
support and the FMS financial aspects. Finally, as the FMS competitor, the direct 
commercial sales (DCS) was described. 
Chapter IV of the thesis has focused on Bahrain Defense Force's (BDF) in- 
house mechanism used to deal with the FMS programs. This chapter also 
explains the advantages, from the perspective of the BDF, of both the FMS and 
the DCS. 
After explaining the policies, the process, and the way of dealing with 
them, Chapter V answers the research question and explains the areas that are 
affected by U.S. arms transfers policies. 
B. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis has been to bring together in one document as 
much unclassified information as possible concerning the impact of U.S. arms 
transfers policies on the recipient force. It has identified factors that are affecting 
the recipient budget planning and his weapon system readiness. 
Military assistance is a valuable instrument of U.S. national security and 
foreign policy. It helps friends and allies deter and defend against aggression and 
contributes to sharing the common defense burden. It promotes overseas 








allies and friends, while demonstrating U.S. commitment to defend common 
interest. An adequate military capability among allies decreases the likelihood 
that U.S. forces will be required if conflict arises and increases the odds that U.S. 
forces will find a relatively favorable situation should a U.S. response be 
required. As the U.S. armed forces continue to downsize and the requirements 
for political coalition type defense operation increases in regions of conflict and 
tension, the military assistance program will remain a critical element of U.S. 
152 
defense policy. 
For the United States, seven different programs can be regarded as part of 
security assistance if both the concessionary and nonconcessionary programs are 
included. 
In addition to preserving the national security, FMS, one element of the 
U.S. security assistance program, also boosts the U.S. economy: 
... each $1 billion spent on new procurement in the United States for 
foreign military sales, whether FMS or foreign national funds, 
directly creates or preserves over 20,000 man years of employment. 
This $1 billion generates in excess of $1.8 billion of income as well 
as significant export to help balance U.S. trade with foreign nations. 
The $1.8 billion of income, in turn, produces over $400 million of ■454 
tax revenue for the U.S. Government. 
In answering the research question "what is the impact of the U.S. arms 
transfers policies on the recipient force planning and readiness?", this research 
has identified four key areas, the FMS contract clauses, the implementation, the 
pricing, and the financing policies, that have an impact on the recipient budget 
planning, rationing, and force development. These areas have become a source of 
continuing changes to the BDF's Five Years Force Development Plan. 
Most FMS customers do not have skilled contract teams. Further, it is not 
easy for them to understand the U.S. Government's complex contract laws. 
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Therefore, even though the purchaser has specified exact requirements, the 
United States often fails to reflect them in the contract. 
The LOA is the primary document used to transmit FMS prices to the 
purchasing country. Elements used in calculating FMS prices may include, but 
are not limited to, the cost of the item; nonrecurring RDT&E and production cost; 
contract administration costs; accessorial charges; and administrative charges. In 
the case of a new procurement for items which are usually delivered directly, 
pricing is established to recover full contract cost plus applicable surcharges. 
P&A or the P&R is only an estimate of total cost. According to the 
General Conditions of DD Form 1513, the purchaser shall make payment(s) to 
the U.S. Government of the total cost to the U.S. Government of the item, even if 
the final total cost exceeds ten percent of the amounts estimated on LOA. Thus, 
the large variance between the estimation and the final cost may make a price 
evaluation worthless. 
FMS is a cost reimbursement agreement which requires advance payment. 
No matter what the estimated costs, payment schedule, or terms of sale specified 
in the LOA, the General Conditions of DD Form 1513 requires that the FMS 
purchaser shall pay in U.S. dollars for the full value of transaction and that there 
shall be no cost to the U.S. Government. 
For a case to be implemented, IAs must request obligational authority, 
and the OA in turn must be passed for DFAS to the applicable IA. OA allows 
items to be released from DoD inventories and contracts to be awarded on the 
purchaser's behalf. Expenditure authority must be requested by the IA from 
DFAS in order to pay contractor invoices. 
The implementation process in some cases may extend to a year or even 
longer, which will in turn affect the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) by delaying other scheduled programs. Beside being lengthy, the 
implementation time for FMS cases can vary from one FMS case to another even 
though each case is very similar. This variation has made it even more difficult to 
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use the already undefined implementation time as a reference for future 
planning. It has also led to uncertainty and delays. 
In addition to the four areas explained above that are affecting the 
recipient force planning, this thesis has also discussed what is considered by the 
DoD to be the most effective means to support customers needs, the Cooperative 
Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA). 
Logistics support is a key element of combat effectiveness. The BDF, like 
any other force, must manage resources efficiently and assess the potential 
capabilities of their limited resources. It is unfortunate that the customer's 
investment in the CLSSA is not fully optimized. The primary reason for this is 
the lack of an accurate method of predicting the actual requirement. Thirty-six 
percent of all investment items on the FMSO I case have had no demand in the 
past four years, with an estimate of funds obligated for those items of $319 
million. 
The policies governing the CLSSA made ammunition, although required 
for weapon system support, ineligible for CLSSA program. Ammunition can be 
ordered on a unique FMS case with an "A" case designator. This method faces 
delays due to the long lead times and the complexity of the parts that make up 
modern types of ammunition. 
Despite the possible problems of depending on foreign suppliers for 
defense requirements, Bahrain's leadership hopes that these problems can be 
overcome by maintaining close ties with the allies. For armed forces such as BDF, 
with limited budget, moderate size, and fully dependent on importing all of its 
military needs, small mistakes can be expensive, petty delays can be serious, and 
unstable flow of support can be harmful. 
FMS is still very efficient. The fact that there is willingness on the part of 
foreign governments to continually buy under FMS guidelines prove this. 
However, room for improvement does exist and some effort is needed in 
considering the buyer's interest. For the United States to be able to rely on its 
friends and allies, it is important to help them maintain high weapon system 
readiness rate by being more responsive to their requests. 
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C.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most of the problems explained above are likely to be solved only by 
political talks or in the process of U.S. policy improvement. The following areas 
are recommended for further research: 
• An effort needs to be made by the U.S. DoD to consolidate into one 
document all laws, implementing rules, regulations, directives, 
instructions, and orders governing the U.S. security assistance, and in 
particular the foreign military sales. Also an effort should be made to 
set up policies relative to the country's capability, background, and 
ability to operate in such a complex system. 
• The U.S. DoD needs to come up with an alternative to the SDAF, 
which was reduced in a defense cut under the Clinton's 
administration, so that the United States would be responsive to its 
customer requirements and able to support their emergency needs. 
• Both the U.S. and foreign governments should clamp down on FMS 
case cost overruns. When the United States assumes total 
responsibility for the management of foreign military sales, it also, by 
inference, assumes part of the responsibility. This is important 
especially in this era of increasing competition between arms suppliers. 
• The U.S. DoD needs to improve its cost estimates techniques, and work 
closely with its customers to give them enough warning time 
regarding any changes in the prices. 
• A method needs to be identified that can accurately predict CLSSA 
investment items. This method must also be capable of quickly 
adjusting for increasing or decreasing demand trends within the 
procurement lead time or repair turn around time of the item. 
• The U.S. DoD must consider either improving ammunition support to 
its customers or making ammunition eligible under the CLSSA 
program. 
• A study of the FMS customers' view of the U.S. system support and 
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• Newsmagazines, newspapers, and the electronic media continue to 
report episodes of corporate and government experience with the total 
quality management (TQM) approach to organization improvement. 
Because TQM is certainly, in all respects, an international 
phenomenon it seems appropriate to study how it can be used to 
improve the execution of FMS. 
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